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Abstract
This dissertation present three studies related to environmental factors that
may help explain early life mortality outcomes, household consumption deci-
sions during childhood that could drive human capital development in later
life, and potential market failures that affect farmers’ returns in rural agri-
cultural markets. The setting for all three studies is India where indicators
of health and human development remain low, particularly in rural areas
where majority of the households rely on agriculture as a primary source of
livelihood.
In chapter two, I analyze the impact of exposure to air pollution on risk of
early childhood mortality. I exploit variation in the incidence of agricultural
fires used by farmers combined with changes in wind direction to estimate
the causal impact of air pollution on infant mortality at a countrywide scale.
I find that in-utero pollution exposure increases infant mortality risk by
more than six percent, with the mortality burden being higher among rural
households and the urban poor.
In chapter three, I examine whether informal contracts provide incentives
for improving product quality in agricultural markets. Using a novel field
experiment, we show that farmers receive only $0.80 for a potential $1 payoff
for improved grain quality. However, we also find that social connections
between a farmer and a trader improve the farmers payoff for quality sug-
gesting that informal, long-term relational contracts can provide incentives
ii
for investing in product quality.
Finally, in chapter four, I examine the unintended consequences of regulat-
ing addictive consumption on intergenerational human capital transmission
using evidence from alcohol prohibition laws in India. I use the variation
in partial alcohol bans that prohibited sale and consumption of cheaper va-
rieties of alcohol across states in India. I show that households exposed to
these partial alcohol bans shift consumption expenditure towards costlier al-
cohol and reduce private investment on health and education of children. In
the long term, this results in an average reduction in the years of schooling
among children who were exposed to these bans of more than four percent
compared to the sample mean.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation presents three studies related to environmental factors that
may help explain early life mortality outcomes, household consumption deci-
sions during childhood that could drive human capital development in later
life, and potential market failures that affect farmers’ returns in rural agri-
cultural markets. The setting for all three studies is India where indicators of
health and human development remain low, particularly in rural areas where
the majority of the households rely on agriculture as a primary source of
livelihood.
In chapter two, I analyze the impact of exposure to air pollution on risk
of early childhood mortality. Globally, studies find an estimated 4 million
people die prematurely because of air pollution every year. Existing litera-
ture relies on exposure-risk relations from studies from developed countries
or high-income urban areas. Little is known about how air pollution impacts
vulnerable subpopulations in the developing world where low incomes and
limited access to health care in rural areas may heighten mortality risk. In
this chapter, I exploit seasonal changes in air quality arising from agricultural
fires used by farmers to clear land for planting. I estimate the causal impact
of air pollution on infant mortality at a countrywide scale by linking satel-
lite imagery on the location and timing of more than 800,000 agricultural
fires with air quality data from pollution monitoring stations and geocoded
survey data on nearly half-a-million births across India over ten years. To
address the concern that fires may be more prevalent in wealthier agricul-
tural regions, I use satellite data on wind direction to isolate the effect of
upwind fires, controlling for other nearby fires. I find that in-utero pollution
exposure increases infant mortality risk by more than six percent relative to
the mean, with the mortality burden being higher among rural households
and the urban poor. These findings underscore the need to recognize het-
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erogeneity in pollution impacts and suggest that failure to do so may cause
underestimation of the adverse effects.
In chapter three, I examine the role of informal contracts based on farmer-
trader relations in determining the returns to product quality in agricultural
markets. Village-level traders in rural India typically enjoy a degree of mar-
ket power combined with better information about desirable product quality
attributes higher up the value chain. As a result, traders can engage in
rent-seeking behavior and farmers may receive suboptimal returns for grain
quality. Quantifying these losses is critical for designing policies to improve
markets and quality information, but existing causal evidence is limited. In
this chapter, I use a novel field experiment to estimate the welfare loss to
farmers due to asymmetric quality information. Our estimates show that
farmers receive $0.80 for a potential $1 payoff for improved grain quality.
However, we also find that social connections between a farmer and a trader
improve the farmers payoff for quality suggesting that informal, long-term
relational contracts can provide incentives for investing in product quality.
Finally, in chapter four, I examine the unintended consequences of regulat-
ing addictive consumption on intergenerational human capital transmission
using evidence from alcohol prohibition laws in India. Prohibition policies
have been, and continue to be, an important public policy tool to regulate
the consumption of addictive goods. In this chapter, I examine a hitherto
unexplored consequence of such policies – their impact on intergenerational
human capital investments. I use the variation in partial alcohol bans that
prohibited sale and consumption of cheaper varieties of alcohol across states
in India. I show that households exposed to these partial alcohol bans shift
consumption expenditure towards costlier alcohol products and reduce pri-
vate investment on health and education of children. In the long term, this
results in an average reduction in the years of schooling among children who
were exposed to these bans of more than four percent compared to the sam-
ple mean. The findings in this study underscore the need for considering
the potential unintended, long-run costs in designing policies for regulating
alcohol, marijuana and other narcotics.
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CHAPTER 2
FIRES, WIND, AND SMOKE: AIR
POLLUTION AND INFANT MORTALITY
2.1 Introduction
Air pollution is thought to be a leading risk factor for premature mortality
death globally, but accurately quantifying the relationship between air qual-
ity and mortality in low- and middle- income countries remains a challenge.
Estimating the causal effect of pollution on health requires overcoming vari-
ous endogeneity concerns and is further complicated in the developing world
bys a paucity of both pollution and health data. As a result, most previous
studies that have used plausibly exogenous sources of variation are confined
to urban areas and focus on vehicular or industrial sources of pollution. Other
studies that have a wider geography usually examine the fallout from forest
fires or other extreme events that lead to a short-term spike in ambient pol-
lution. Both scenarios raise concerns of external validity. Additionally, they
typically lack the statistical power required to investigate the differential ef-
fects across subpopulations like rural and low-income urban households with
limited options for avoidance behavior and low access to healthcare.
In this study, I overcome the empirical challenges outlined above by har-
nessing the marginal changes in air quality caused by seasonal agricultural
fires used by farmers to clear land for agriculture and burn crop-residue after
harvest. Using satellite data on agricultural fires and wind direction over
India, I match the location and timing of each birth from a nationally rep-
resentative household survey data to exposure from up-wind fires 1. The
identifying assumption is that after controlling for seasonal and other cli-
matic variables, the variation in wind-direction and fire activity is unlikely
1 Up-wind and down-wind throughout the text are used relative to a household’s lo-
cations. Therefore up-wind fires refer to those fires that are in the direction that wind is
blowing from at each household’s location.
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to affect birth outcomes except through air pollution. I provide support
for this assumption by using pollution monitoring station data to show that
particulate levels increase with up-wind fire activity but are not affected by
down-wind fires.
The approach used in this paper offers several improvements over previ-
ous studies investigating the link between air pollution and infant mortality.
Agricultural fires occur across the country with a wide degree of seasonal and
spatial variation (Figure 2.1). The household survey data used in this study
records the complete birth histories for each woman interviewed which allows
us to construct a dataset of nearly half-a-million births and their mortality
outcomes from 2006 to 2016. In combination with changing wind direction,
the data and the identification strategy allow me to measure the impact of
variation in pollution exposure over a much larger area and time period than
previous studies and investigate the heterogeneity in exposure-response re-
lationships across subpopulations. A further advantage of this methodology
is that it limits potential measurement error in exposure to pollution. Pol-
lution monitoring stations are sparsely located in most developing countries
and relying on monitoring data for measuring exposure can lead to attenu-
ation towards zero, and result in underestimating the effect. Using satellite
measures of agricultural fire activity along with geocoded household locations
allows me to circumvent this measurement issue.
This study provides the first large-scale causal estimates of the infant mor-
tality costs of air pollution in India. This developing country setting is of
particular significance with 90 percent of the 4.2 million premature deaths at-
tributed to ambient air pollution in 2015 occurring in low- and middle-income
countries (WHO, 2016). Along with India, the use of agricultural fires is
growing across many developing countries. Crop-residue burning alone is es-
timated to contribute nearly 30,000 gigagrams of carbon dioxide equivalents
(more than four times the total emissions from the transportation sector in
the U.S) in 2016 (FAO, 2018; US EPA, OA, 2018). These emissions have
grown by more than 1.2 percent per year on average within the 2006 - 2016
period (FAO, 2018). Therefore, the results in this study have significant im-
plications for other low-income countries that are seeing widespread use of
agricultural fires.
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Agricultural fires are used in India to clear land for crops and to burn
stubble left on fields after harvest. Both types of burning are estimated to
contribute to the air pollution in India and surrounding regions (Venkatara-
man et al., 2006). Crop-residue burning is estimated to contribute as much
as half of the particulate pollution in some cities in India during harvest sea-
sons (Kaskaoutis et al., 2014; Cusworth et al., 2018). The location of these
fires is driven by agricultural practices, including the expansion of mechan-
ical harvesting (Gupta, 2012). In central and north-eastern parts of India,
farmers frequently burn forest growth to clear land for their annual crop
(Venkataraman et al., 2006). In contrast, crop-residue burning is common in
the agriculturally productive regions of the Indo-Gangetic plain where farm-
ers have access to irrigation and plant two or more seasons of crops during a
year. Given these underlying drivers of crop residue burning, the location of
agricultural fires is likely to be correlated with other factors that influence
child health outcomes, complicating the empirical estimation of the effects
of such fires on infant mortality. I overcome this identification challenge by
isolating the effect of exposure to agricultural fires that occur up-wind of a
households location and show that pollution levels increase only from up-
wind fires.
I draw upon multiple satellite data sources to assemble a spatial panel
dataset on agricultural fire activity, wind conditions and other climatic vari-
ables across India spanning a ten-year period. Using administrative data
from the government of India’s Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), I
also construct a monthly panel of air pollution measures for over 250 cities
for 2013-15. Finally, I combine the satellite measures of fire activity and wind
direction with information on infant births and mortality outcomes from a
geocoded national scale household survey the National Family and Health
Survey 4 (International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF,
2017). Using these data, I present two sets of empirical results. First, I
document the impact of agricultural fires on pollution measures. Second,
I present estimates of fires on the effect on neonatal and infant mortality
and other birth outcomes. In both cases, the identification strategy is sim-
ilar in spirit to a difference-in-differences approach. I compare the changes
in the outcome (pollution or mortality rates) within the same season over
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different years, and across locations with high versus locations with a low
incidence of up-wind fires. The main specification estimating the mortality
effects controls for season time-trends for each sample cluster in the NFHS
survey. Each sample cluster is approximately analogous to a village. This
specification compares changes in mortality among children born within the
same season in the same village, across different years. The results remain
robust to the use of mother fixed effects which compares the birth outcomes
for siblings born under different pollution exposure levels. Alternative fixed
effects which control flexibly for season and location at slightly higher lev-
els of aggregation such as district or state also show similar results. I also
undertake sensitivity tests varying the catchment area (i.e. buffer) used to
calculate the fire exposure around each household location and find that the
estimates remain consistent. Finally, I also show that fire exposure during
months 13-14 after birth and 1-2 months after birth do not predict mortality
within the first year or the month of birth, respectively. These additional
tests reduce the concern that these pollution impacts might be driven by
other unobserved factors.
To first measure the effect of agricultural fires on pollution, I combine the
air quality measures with the agricultural fires and wind data to calculate the
incidence of up-wind fires at the city-month level. Consistent with previous
work on the pollution impact of agricultural fires in India within the atmo-
spheric sciences literature, I find that up-wind agricultural fires have a robust
and significant effect on particulate matter as measured by PM10 levels (Liu
et al., 2018; Kaskaoutis et al., 2014). These results are also consistent with
a growing set of studies within economics that utilize wind movements to
construct a plausibly exogenous source of variation in pollution (Deryugina
et al., 2018; Rangel and Vogl, 2019; Anderson, 2016). Additionally, I show
that down-wind fires do not affect the pollution level. Further, I find that
the impact of up-wind fires on PM10 is non-linear. Low levels of fire activity
(less than four fires in the month) do not affect PM10, whereas a higher in-
tensity of fires (5 or more fires) increases PM10 levels by an average of more
than 3 percent.
The main results in the paper focus on the impact of exposure to up-wind
agricultural fires during in-utero months on infant birth outcomes. Previous
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studies within both economics and the medical literature find an increase in
the mortality risk due to pollution exposure during pregnancy. While it is
known that embryos and fetuses are susceptible to damage from air pollution,
the biological mechanisms that link in-utero pollution exposure to adverse
birth outcomes are still debated. Recent medical studies hypothesize that
air pollution potentially leads to oxidative stress, inflammation, and hemo-
dynamic changes that damage oxygen and nutrient transport to the fetus
(La Marca and Gava, 2018). The period of the pregnancy in which pollution
exposure is most relevant for infant mortality is likely to vary by the type
of pollutant (Lacasan˜a et al., 2005). However, some recent systematic re-
views of available data suggest that the effect is most pronounced during the
third trimester of pregnancy when oxidative stress within the womb might
be higher (Ritz and Wilhelm, 2008; Stieb et al., 2012). The data and the
availability of pollution exposure measures over a long time period allows me
to explore the effect across the in-utero months in this study.
I use data from birth histories of women aged 15-49 interviewed in the
National Family and Health Survey (NFHS 4) limiting the sample to births
recorded within the last ten years (from 2006 2016) to minimize recall er-
rors. I include birth histories of only those women who have resided in the
same location since the birth was recorded to avoid measurement error due
to migration. The birth histories provide information on the month and year
of child birth, whether the child survived and if deceased, the age at death.
Using this information, I construct measures of in utero agricultural fire ex-
posure, i.e., the number of fires that were within a certain radius up-wind
of the household’s location during each of the months that the mother was
pregnant. I then estimate the impact on mortality using exposure for each
of the in-utero months. For both neonatal and infant mortality, exposure
during the late pregnancy months and the month of birth is found to have
the most substantial effect. The heightened air-pollution exposure risk dur-
ing the final months of pregnancy is consistent with results from previous
studies in the economic literature. For instance, Jayachandran (2009) finds
that exposure to pollution from Indonesian forest fires in the three months
before birth has a strong negative effect on survival. Rangel and Vogl (2019)
also find that exposure to pollution from sugarcane burning during the last
13 weeks of gestation has a strong negative effect on birthweight. Similar ad-
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verse effects of exposure to particulate matter and carbon monoxide during
the late pregnancy periods have been documented in epidemiological studies
in the US as well (Wilhelm and Ritz, 2005; Ritz and Yu, 1999).
The results from the preferred specification that controls for season by
sample cluster fixed effects show that exposure to pollution from up-wind
agricultural fires increases neonatal mortality rate and infant mortality rate,
while downwind fires have no effect. The increase in mortality ranges from
by 2.8 additional deaths per 1000 births for neonatal mortality to 3.0 addi-
tional deaths for infant mortality - an increase of more than 8 percent and 6.6
percent relative to the sample mean of 33.9 neonatal and 45.4 infant deaths
per 1000 births. These results also remain robust to varying the extent of the
area around each household that is used to measure exposure to fires. I also
examine the impact on mortality risk at age 5 and find similar, consistent
results. In-utero exposure to up-wind fires increases under-5 mortality rate
by nearly 3.3 additional deaths per 1000 births (6.6 percent increase relative
to the sample mean).
To compare these results with the existing literature on pollution exposure,
I convert the effects of up-wind fires into mortality effects in terms of change
in pollutant levels. Using the estimates from the effect of up-wind fires on
PM10, I find that an increase in PM10 levels of 10 µg/m3 (an increase of
approximately 10 percent of the mean PM10 level) results in an increase in
infant mortality rate of 9.1 deaths per 1000 births, more than 20 percent of
the sample infant mortality rate mean of 45.4 deaths per 1000 births. These
effects are much higher than those found in Africa and Mexico City (Heft-
Neal et al., 2018; Arceo et al., 2016) and similar to the 19 percent mortality
effect found in China for the 0-4 age group (He et al., 2016).
I then examine the differential effects across various subpopulations of
interest in the sample. The results suggest that the mortality impact of agri-
cultural fires is much higher within rural areas relative to urban populations.
Neonatal mortality increases by 3.2 and infant mortality by 3.6 additional
deaths per 1000 births in the sample of rural births. The corresponding
point estimates for urban births are 1.02 and 0.51 for neonatal and infant
mortality respectively. However these estimates for the urban sample are
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fairly imprecise with wide standard errors. The results also show a similar
pattern for under-5 mortality it increases in rural areas by more than seven
percent, while there is no effect in urban regions. While the overall effect in
urban regions is relatively muted, I find that poorer urban households fare
worse. However, wealth level does not change the mortality risk for rural
households. Overall, the results indicate that wealthier urban households
may be able to undertake avoidance behavior such as staying indoors during
pregnancy. They may also have better access to health and maternal care
services such as deliveries in hospitals that could mitigate the immediate con-
sequences of air pollution on birth outcomes. These urban-rural disparities
are consistent with the findings in the previous literature that document the
existence of higher pollution burden on rural residents (Neidell, 2004; GBD
MAPS Working Group, 2018).
Further, I find some evidence that down-wind fire activity is associated
with a decline in the infant mortality rate. This finding goes to show that
fire activity is likely to be associated with other economic and agricultural
productivity factors that appear positively correlated with 12-month surviv-
ability. Using data for a sub-sample of births for whom additional health
inputs information is recorded I find that agricultural fire activity is posi-
tively associated with an increased likelihood of having delivered the birth
at a hospital, formal health records for the child and increased vaccination
rates in the first year. These health investments are likely to offset some of
the adverse effects of the pollution exposure which is captured by the nega-
tive sign on down-wind fire activity. Therefore, it is essential to differentiate
between exposures to up-wind versus down-wind fires.
Finally, I also take advantage of the nationally representative nature of the
data to present estimates of the total number of deaths attributable to pollu-
tion exposure within the population. Population estimates indicate that the
average number of neonatal deaths per year in India from all causes to be 0.8
million during the sample period (UN IGME, 2018). Given this, the average
impact from the regression estimates of an eight percent increase in neonatal
mortality due to pollution implies that nearly 65,000 deaths per year oc-
cur due to in-utero exposure to pollution. Similarly, the average number of
under-5 deaths per year for the sample period is estimated to be 1.47 million
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per year (UN IGME, 2018). Given these mortality estimates, the results in
this study imply an additional mortality burden of more than 95,000 under-5
deaths per year due to exposure to agricultural fires. In terms of pollution
levels, the results imply that an increase in PM10 of 10 µg/m3 results in
more than 105,000 additional under-5 deaths per year. These estimates are
a much larger mortality cost than thought previously. For instance, most
recent disease burden models estimate about 51,000 under-5 deaths in India
attributable to ambient air-pollution risk during 2015 (Lee and Kim, 2018;
Lelieveld et al., 2018). These estimates apply exposure-response functions
based on studies in wealthier contexts and have been found to underestimate
the mortality impact of pollution in Africa as well (Heft-Neal et al., 2018).
This paper contributes to the growing literature from the fields of eco-
nomics, environment, and epidemiology that examines the health burden of
air pollution. Within economics, the focus has often been on modern, indus-
trial sources of pollution within developed countries owing to the relatively
better data availability on air quality measures (Graff Zivin and Neidell,
2013). Recent work has expanded to look at the consequences of air pollu-
tion on health, education and labor market outcomes in developing countries
(Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Bharadwaj et al., 2017; Hanna and Oliva,
2015). Overall, these studies indicate a significant adverse effect on human
capital outcomes. However, these studies are mostly limited to specific cities
and focus on pollution sources that are more common in urban settings. One
might be concerned that rural households, particularly in countries like India
with a large population of rural poor, might be particularly vulnerable given
that they are primarily engaged in outdoor work. Other studies that look at
the effect of pollution from large-scale fires such as forest wildfires (Sastry,
2002; Jayachandran, 2009; Kim et al., 2017). While these studies shed light
on the potential effects of biomass burning, such events studied are usually
rare, with extreme levels of pollution. These results may differ from the ef-
fects that one would find in response to cyclical exposure to moderate levels
of pollution that result from smaller, agricultural fires.
The closest previous study is by Rangel and Vogl (2019) who examine the
effect of sugarcane residue burning in the state of Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, also
exploiting the direction of the wind. Their analysis uses birth registry data
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from hospital records in 13 sugar-growing municipalities within Sa˜o Paulo
from 2009-2014, and the outcomes that they focus on are those observed
immediately after birth. They find that exposure to fires results in adverse
birth outcomes such as low birth-weight but find no impact on risk of mor-
tality within the first day of life. This study adds to their result in several
different ways. First, while their analysis is limited to the outcomes at birth,
the NFHS data used in this study allows for an examination of not only
health outcomes at birth but also the mortality risk at different periods of
early childhood. Previous studies have found that fetal exposure to adverse
temperature, rainfall and pollution has a significant impact on health out-
comes in later-infancy, childhood and adult life as well (Almond and Currie,
2011; Currie et al., 2014). Second, the context for their study differs from
this paper in many characteristics. With a mostly urban population, Sa˜o
Paulo has a much lower infant mortality rate of 11 deaths per 1000 births,
higher income and much better health delivery systems than India where the
mortality rate is nearly four times higher (44 deaths per 1000 births, average
of 2006-2016) (The World Bank, 2018). As a result, the degree of vulnera-
bility to air pollution in India may be much higher. This heightened risk is
evidenced by the fact that they find no effect on mortality risk at birth, while
the results from this study show a significant neonatal mortality cost due to
agricultural fires. The nature of pollution exposure from agricultural fires is
also likely to differ sugarcane burning in Brazil occurs once a year as op-
posed to the seasonal agricultural fires that peak more than once a year and
covers a much larger territory across India. Consequently, births exposed to
fire emissions in India are much higher. The results in this paper are likely
to be generalizable to other developing country contexts where agriculture
associated fires are frequent and where households have limited access to
safety or avoidance mechanisms.
2.2 Background: Agricultural fires in India
Agricultural burning has been used to clear land for agriculture and get rid of
crop waste since the early periods of human history (Brandt, 1966). Limited
use of fires, under controlled conditions, can help in land renewal, removal
of invasive species and pests and can provide other ecosystem benefits. In
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India, farmers use open field burning for two main purposes. First, it is used
to clear stubble left on the field after harvesting and second, it is also used to
clear undergrowth on lands left fallow between cropping seasons (Venkatara-
man et al., 2006).
There is a wide spatial and temporal gap between these two types of burn-
ing practices associated with agriculture in India. Crop-residue burning is
mainly associated with the stubble left over from rice and wheat crop. Farm-
ers employing the rice-wheat system usually grow rice in the monsoon or the
kharif season. The crop is sown following the onset of monsoon rains in
June-July and harvested during the months of October-November. Wheat
is then planted as soon as possible in the wheat (rabi) season and harvested
starting in April. Crop-residue fires are seen in post-harvest months corre-
sponding to these cropping seasons in areas where the rice-wheat system is
dominant such as in the states of Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
and Himachal Pradesh. Under the rice-wheat system, farmers have a limited
window within which they need to harvest and clear their field before plant-
ing next season’s crop. A crucial input in this quick turnaround has been the
use of combined harvesters. The harvester usually spreads the crop residue
in the fields which can be time and labor intensive for farmers to collect. As
a result, farmers tend to burn this residue to clear their fields quickly and at
a low cost (Kumar et al., 2015). These fires are often observed within prox-
imity to urban areas. Delhi, the capital city, is particularly prone to high
levels of pollution from post-harvest fires (Cusworth et al., 2018; Chandra and
Sinha, 2016; Ghosal and Chatterjee, 2015). Consequently, much of the focus
on agricultural fires in India has been on such crop-residue burning practices.
In contrast to crop-residue burning, previous literature has mostly ig-
nored the pollution implications of fires used for clearing agricultural land.
These fires mostly occur close to forest lands in central and north-east India
(Venkataraman et al., 2006). Farmers in these regions usually plant one sea-
son of rice and then leave the land empty after harvest. Many follow shifting
agriculture where the land is left fallow for more than a year, and the farmers
switch between alternate plots of land across years (Ramakrishnan, 1992).
These fallow lands may be overtaken by undergrowth and weeds which need
to be removed before planting the next rice season. Farmers resort to the
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use of fire to clear these lands, and such fires peak during February to May
(Venkataraman et al., 2006).
The effect of seasonal crop-residue burning on pollution levels in India has
been a source of growing concern for policymakers and researchers. Sev-
eral studies in the fields of atmospheric and environmental sciences have
examined the emissions from these fires. These studies use a combination of
atmospheric modeling methods and statistical analysis and mostly focus on
a specific city or region, primarily in the vicinity of the rice-wheat system
states. Across sites, these studies have documented a significant increase
in particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5), aerosol concentrations as well as
sulfur and nitrous oxide levels associated with increased agricultural fire ac-
tivity. For instance, Mittal et al. (2009) find an increase in PM 2.5 of more
than 547 µg/m3 in the city of Patiala in Punjab. Cusworth et al. (2018) esti-
mate that up to 78 percent of the PM2.5 increases in Delhi can be attributed
to agricultural fires during peak harvest seasons in some years. Similar as-
sociations have been found over a larger region of analysis as well. Mishra
and Shibata (2012) find that aerosol optical depth increases by 0.1 0.3 over
the Indo-Gangetic Plain during seasons with agricultural fires. The results
that I present in this study on the impact of agricultural fires on pollution
measures are consistent with those found in much of this literature.
While substantial evidence within the physical and atmospheric science
literature links agricultural fires to pollution emissions, the evidence on the
impact of pollution from agricultural fires on health outcomes in India is very
scant. Chakrabarti et al. (2019) is one of the few studies to have investigated
this relationship. The authors undertake a multivariate regression analysis
examining the association between self-reported respiratory acute respiratory
infection events and district-level fire counts. They find that living in a
district which was in the top quintile of fires per day was associated with a
three-fold increase in individuals reporting that they seek medical treatment
for respiratory problems. They further report that the risk is higher for
children under five years of age. However, currently no evidence exists on
the impact of pollution from agricultural fires on early life mortality outcomes
in India.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Agricultural fires
Administrative data on agricultural fire incidents are not available in much
of the developing world, and India is no exception. However, it is possi-
ble to detect fires from space using satellite-derived thermal information. I
use fire detection data accessed from the MODIS (Terra and Aqua datasets)
Fire Mapper product (collection 5, spatial resolution 1 1 km) provided by
the Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) 2. The algo-
rithm used to detect fire activity exploits the intense emission of mid-infrared
radiation from fires (Giglio et al., 2003). The MODIS algorithm examines
the radiation from each pixel of the MODIS swath and flags it as having a
fire if at least one thermal anomaly is detected within that pixel (National
Aeronautics and Space Admnistration (NASA), 2018). The dataset con-
sists of a daily record of these fire pixels along with geographic coordinates
that correspond to the approximate center for each pixel. A pixel over the
geographic region encompassing India corresponds to an area of about one
square kilometer on the ground.
The algorithm detects both actively burning fires and smoldering patches.
The data are acquired by the satellites at least once daily over the whole In-
dian region. Giglio et al. (2003) note that fires under 1000 square-meters are
detectable under average conditions, which corresponds to about one-tenth
the size of an average agricultural field size in India of about 1.15 hectare
(Bodh et al., 2016) and therefore provides a high degree of confidence that
majority of the on-field agricultural fires are captured in the data 3.
There are more than 800,000 pixels with fire activity during the study pe-
2Available online at: https://earthdata.nasa.gov/active-fire-data
3There are a couple of caveats to be noted about the use of MODIS fire data product.
First, the data corresponds to fire pixels having at least one fire, and there is no way of
knowing how many fires are within each pixel. So, the fire counts may be an underestimate
of the actual number of fires that are on the ground within each pixel. Second, while most
of the fires recorded in the data are vegetation fires, it is possible that volcanic eruptions
or flares from gas wells may also be detected as thermal anomalies and flagged as fire
pixels. This is less of an issue in the context of this study since the Indian region has no
active volcanoes on the mainland, and most natural gas wells are located offshore.
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riod from 2006-2016. For each such fire pixel, the data record the location
and the detection date. Figure 2.1 shows the seasonal variation in the agri-
cultural fire incidents recorded by the MODIS instrument over the sample
period. Panel (a) of the figure portrays the fires recorded from February
to June. These fires correspond to the land clearing fires used by farmers
mostly in the north-eastern states of the country and some in the central
regions as well. We also find some fire activity in the north and north-west
regions which corresponds to the burning of crop-residue left on the field af-
ter the winter crop harvest. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the fires that occur
from September to January. This period corresponds to the harvesting of
the monsoon (kharif) crop, mostly rice. The fire activity is predominantly
concentrated in the northern regions of the country, around the states of
Punjab, Haryana, and parts of western Uttar Pradesh.
2.3.2 Pollution monitor data
Daily pollution meter data is obtained from the Central Pollution Control
Board (Central Pollution Control Board, 2018). The CPCB operates under
the aegis of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of the
Government of India and is the primary regulatory and monitoring agency
for environmental pollution. Ground-based measurements of air pollution
levels in India are limited to urban areas and not available for much of the
rural hinterland. Given these limitations, I focus on examining the link be-
tween agricultural fires and air quality within nearby cities. The pollution
meters record data on sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particulate matter (PM10),
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) for a sub-sample of cities.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the cities for which the pollution meter
data are available. The number of pollution monitoring stations per city
varies from a single monitoring station for smaller cities to a maximum of 19
stations for larger cities such as Delhi or Mumbai, with a median of 3 stations.
I limit the sample of observations to recent years (2013-15) in the dataset
for which consistent coverage is available. I also aggregate the pollution
measures to the monthly average level in each city. In total, the final dataset
consists of more than 250 cities, spanning the period from January 2013 to
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December 2015. Table 1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics on
the number of fire counts with a 75 km radius around each city center.
2.3.3 Data on wind and other climatic variables
The critical atmospheric information that I utilize in the identification strat-
egy is the wind direction over the locations of interest. The data for con-
structing this variable comes from the Remote Sensing Systems Cross - Cali-
brated Multi-Platform (CCMP) vector wind analysis product (Version 2.0).4
The CCMP wind data product has near-global coverage with high-spatial
and temporal resolution, starting in 1987 (Ricciardulli, 2017). I obtain a
0.25 degree gridded wind vector data at the monthly level from 2006 2016.
The wind data are a combination of satellite, ground-based and wind model
measurements; further details are documented in (Atlas et al., 2011). The
data are in the form of the monthly mean horizontal (U) and vertical (V)
components of the wind vector for each grid cell. The U and V components
are relative to true north, i.e., they have positive values if the wind is blowing
towards the north-east direction. Using these two components, I calculate
the wind direction and speed using the standard functions
θ = arctan2(V, U) (2.1)
s = (U2 + V 2)1/2 (2.2)
where θ ∈ (−pi, pi] is the angle (in radians) relative to the positive x-axis
and s is the wind speed. I then use this direction to classify the wind direc-
tion to one of eight octants. Going clockwise from north, these octants range
from north-to-north-east (NNE) when
pi
4
≤ θ ≤ pi
2
to north-west-to-north
(NWN) when
pi
2
≤ θ ≤ 3pi
4
.
In addition to the wind data, I also use satellite and climatic model-based
data on temperature and precipitation. Temperature and rainfall shocks have
been found to affect mortality and human health in a variety of contexts, in-
4CCMP Version-2.0 vector wind analyses are produced by Remote Sensing Systems.
Data are available at www.remss.com
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cluding India (Burgess et al., 2017; Maccini and Yang, 2009). Further, they
might also affect the dispersion of smoke from the fires. Therefore, I con-
trol for these factors in the estimates. The temperature data are retrieved
from the Global Historical Climatology Network (version 2) and the Climate
Anomaly Monitoring System (GHCN CAMS). GHCN CAMS is a high reso-
lution (0.5x0.5 degree) analyzed global land surface temperatures from 1948
to near present . GHCN CAMS uses data from station observations across
the globe combined with interpolation techniques to construct the gridded
data. Fan and van den Dool (2008) describe the process in detail. Rainfall
data come from the Climate Hazards Group Infrared Precipitation with Sta-
tions (CHIRPS). CHIRPS uses satellite imagery along with in-situ station
data to create a gridded rainfall product at a very high spatial resolution
and available in near real-time (Funk et al., 2015). I use monthly average
rainfall data from CHIRPS with 0.05 x 0.05-degree spatial resolution over
the 2006-2016 period. I use a distance weighted interpolation method to
estimate the wind, temperature and precipitation data values at the point
locations of the cities in case of the pollution results, or the sample clusters
(location of households) when examining the impact on infant mortality 5.
2.3.4 Infant mortality and birth outcomes data
The data for the outcome measures of infant mortality and health come from
the National Family and Health Survey IV (NFHS 4). The NFHS is the De-
mographic and Health Survey (DHS) equivalent in India. The NFHS 4 survey
collected data from January 2015 December 2016 from over 600,000 house-
holds covering all areas of the country (International Institute for Population
Sciences, 2017). This sample size was much larger than previous rounds of
the NFHS (nearly four times larger than in NFHS 3), and the sample was de-
signed to be representative at the district level. For each sample household,
the NFHS 4 survey canvassed four questionnaires: a household questionnaire,
a woman’s questionnaire, a man’s questionnaire and a biomarker survey.
The main variables in this analysis come from the woman’s questionnaire.
The NFHS interviews all eligible women between the ages of 15-49 within
5The results are similar across a variety of interpolation methods including bilinear or
cubic spline estimates.
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each sample household on a variety of issues. Each woman is asked about
her entire reproductive history thereby providing details on the birth histo-
ries of all children ever born to her. The birth histories include information
on when a child was born (month and year), their gender, and birth order.
The survey also records whether the child is currently alive, and if not, the
the age at which the child died is collected. For births that occurred within
five years of the survey, the woman is also asked about other birth outcomes
including the child’s weight at birth. The analysis of infant mortality that
I carry out uses this recall data on child births and deaths. For the whole
sample of women interviewed in the NFHS 4, a total of 1,315,617 births are
recorded in the birth history data.
The use of recall birth history data may lead to potential measurement
error. For instance, the selective omission of those births that did not sur-
vive from the birth histories would result in an underestimation of mortality
(International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF, 2017). How-
ever, the infant mortality rates from the NFHS birth history data are very
close to the mortality statistics that the Census Bureau of India provides
based on its Sample Registration System (SRS) of births lending support to
the accuracy of deaths reported in the recalled birth history in the NFHS. I
provide further details later when discussing the descriptive statistics.
A second potential source of error could arise from measurement error in
the recall of the timing of births and deaths. To minimize such bias, I limit
the sample used in the main set of estimates to births recorded within the
past ten years before the survey (about 472,000 births). The results are ro-
bust to varying this recall time horizon. Finally, exposure to pollution from
agricultural fires could be mismeasured if the child was born in a different
location than the location in which the household currently resides. The
NFHS records information on how long the individual has resided in this
location. I utilize these data to restrict my sample to only those births that
have occurred since the interviewed woman has been residing in the current
location. By doing so, I exclude about 12 percent of the births within the
past ten years.
From an empirical standpoint, one of the main advantages of using the
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NFHS 4 data for this analysis is the availability of geo-referenced sample
clusters. There are more than 28000 sample clusters in NFHS 4, with each
cluster containing an average of 46 households. To ensure respondent confi-
dentiality the cluster GPS latitude/longitude coordinates are randomly dis-
placed in the public NFHS 4 data files. Urban clusters are displaced between
0 to 2 kilometers, and rural clusters are displaced between 0 to 5 kilometers.
Further, about 1 percent of the rural clusters are displaced up to 10 kilome-
ters. In all cases, the displacement is restricted so that the final coordinates
lie within the boundaries of the original district from which the households
were sampled. I minimize the spatial measurement error by using agricul-
tural fire exposure over a much larger buffer of 75 kilometers around each
cluster that accounts for any error due to the displacement in the clusters
coordinates. Also, the results remain robust to varying the buffer radius.
Table 1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics on the number of fire
counts in the in-utero months within a buffer of 75 km radius.
2.4 Empirical methodology
The empirical methodology for measuring the impact of agricultural fires on
pollution as well as infant outcomes is similar. The main estimation equation
is of the following form:
Yi,c,m,y × 1000 = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkFiresup,c,r,m,y +
K∑
k=1
δkFiresdown,c,r,m,y (2.3)
+γF iresother,c,r,m,y + αf(Tc,m,y, P recipc,m,y, Sc,m,y)
+ΓXi + µc,q + ηy + λm + εi,c,m,y
where Yi,c,m,y is the outcome variable. In the pollution equation, the out-
come variable is the PM10 levels measured in city c, in month m, for year y.
In the case of infant birth outcomes, the outcome variable is the birth out-
come for individual i, born in cluster c, during month m, and year y. When
the outcome is mortality, I scale this variable so that it takes the value 0
when the individual survives and takes the value 1000 if the individual dies.
This allows for the coefficients to be interpreted in terms of standard mortal-
19
ity rate measured as deaths per 1000 births.Firesup,c,r,m,y, the main variable
of interest is a measure of the exposure to up-wind fires (described below). I
also control for measures of down-wind fires (Firesdown,c,r,m,y) as well as fires
that are in other (neither up- or down- wind) directions (Firesother,c,r,m,y).
Additional controls include month-year mean temperature, precipitation and
wind (Tc,m,y, P recipc,m,y, Sc,m,y), their interaction as well as squared terms.
I also control for individual, maternal and household characteristics such as
the gender of the child, maternal age and education, religion, caste group,
household asset index and other factors. The regression equation includes lo-
cation specific seasonal fixed effects (city- or cluster-by-quarter of birth FE)
µc,q, year FE ηy and month FE λm.This specification flexibly accounts for
city/cluster specific seasonal trends, and controls for time invariant spatial
and seasonal (quarter) unobservable characteristics within each city/cluster.
The identification is therefore based on comparing the change in outcomes
within a city- or cluster-quarter over different years with respect to change
in the intensity of up-wind agricultural fires.
For the heterogeneity analysis, I interact the up-wind fire exposure variable
with key characteristics to examine differential effects across various dimen-
sions. I also present results from using alternative fixed effects specifications.
In particular, given that nearly 80 percent of the women in the sample have
more than one child, I present results using mother fixed effects as well. This
specification compares the change in mortality outcome within siblings ex-
posed to varying levels of pollution in-utero.
I construct measures of exposure to agricultural fires around each city or
cluster c for month m in year y as follows. I first find the prevailing wind
direction for each month-year for each city or cluster using the gridded wind
product. Second, I calculate the number of fires around each c within varying
radii, as well as the bearing (angle) between each fire in the buffers and the
location of c. I then create counts of the fires in each octant (45-degree
sectors) of the circular buffer. Using the wind direction and location of these
fires, I aggregate the fires that are up- and down-wind of each cluster or city.
For instance, if the wind is blowing from the southwest-west (SWW) octant
towards north-northeast octant (NNE), then the fires that are in the SWW
direction are up-wind fires (Firesup,c,r,m,y) and those in the NNE direction are
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down-wind (Firesdown,c,r,m,y). I first present results for the pollution impact
using a flexible specification of the Firesup and Firesdown and show evidence
for the non-linear effect of the up-wind fires. Based on these initial results,
the main specification that I use relies on splitting the fire counts into bins.
2.5 Impact of agricultural fires on pollution
2.5.1 Preliminary evidence
I use the daily air quality measures from the Central Pollution Control Board
(CPCB) for 257 cities during 2013-2015 to estimate the effect of agricultural
fires on pollution. While many cities have more than one pollution measur-
ing station, data on the location of each measuring station is unavailable.
Therefore, I aggregate air quality measures to the city level. I geocode the
city locations at the approximate center of each city and use this as the
reference to calculate the fire counts as well as to interpolate the wind and
other climatic variables. The primary air quality measure that I focus on
is the level of particulate matter measured by PM10 levels in micrograms
per cubic meter (µg/m3). I also have data on sulfur dioxide for this period,
and measures of nitrogen dioxide for some cities (130 out of the 257 cities),
and I present results of the impact of fires on these measures in the appendix.
I first present descriptive evidence showing the link between pollution and
agricultural fires. Figure 2.2 shows the weekly variation in the average value
of PM10 across all the sample cities for the year 2015. Also shown in the
same plot is the average weekly number of fires in the up-wind direction
within 100 km of each city. The PM10 levels and the number of fires track
closely with each other. Two additional points stand out from this figure.
First, we see two definite periods of high fire activity that correspond to
the seasonal variation in fires described earlier and shown in Figure 1 for
the whole sample period. Second, the PM10 levels, on average, are several
magnitudes higher than safe air quality standards for this sample of India
cities. The mean PM10 level is 93.3 which is more than four times the WHO
prescribed safe level of 20 µg/m3 annual mean (World Health Organization
2006, 9) and more than 1.5 times the CPCB prescribed standard of 60 µg/m3
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per year. The average PM10 levels remain much higher than these safe levels
even during the weeks when fire activity is low.
A similar picture is presented by the descriptive statistics of the air pollu-
tion measures for the full sample period 2013 2015 in Table 2.1 Column (1)
and (2) present the mean levels for city-months with above zero (the median)
number of fires and with zero fires respectively, and column (3) presents the
mean and standard deviation for the full sample. The difference in means in
PM10 levels between (1) and (2) is nearly 15 units (Column (4)), more than
16 percent higher than the average PM10 value for the city-months with zero
fires in Column (2). Similar higher average levels of SO2 and NO2 are also
observed for the city-months with at least one up-wind fire. As with PM10
levels in 2015 seen in Figure 3, the overall PM10 average across the three-
year period remains much higher than prescribed safe levels at more than 97
µg/m3. Given these already high pollution levels, the marginal impact of a
single fire within the vicinity of a city is likely to be small, but the effect is
more likely to be detectable at higher levels of fire activity. This intuition is
reflected in the regression results presented below.
2.5.2 Regression results
While the pollution data is at the daily level, analysis at this temporal scale
is difficult due to missing data issues. Similar problems are documented pre-
viously in the economics and atmospheric science literature using these data
in the Indian context (Burgess et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018). Also, the in-
fant birth outcome analysis can be performed only at the monthly level since
only the month of birth is recorded. Therefore, to keep the analysis consis-
tent between these two sets of results, I focus on estimating the pollution
equation at the city-month level. I first estimate the regression equation 2.3
using a flexible functional form for the number of fires by using indicators
for each fire from 1 to 9 and a separate category for a higher number of fires.
I present these coefficients in Figure 2.3. The regression equations for both
these figures control for fires in the other directions. Panel (a) presents the
coefficients on the up-wind fire categories using a 75 km buffer around each
city while panel (b) presents corresponding results for a 100 km buffer. In
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each case, we find graphical evidence suggesting a threshold effect wherein
the marginal PM10 response is relatively flat for 1-4 fires but shows a positive
increase for five or more fires in the up-wind direction.
Given this non-linearity that we observe in the effect of fires on PM10, I
create three up-wind fire bins with ranges {0} , [1, 4] , ≥ 5 corresponding
to the overall pattern that we observe in Figure 2.3. Table 2.2 presents the
results using these categories for up-wind fires and down-wind fires. Also, I
control for the number of fires that are in the other directions (non-up/down
fires). Consistent with Figure 2.3 we find that 1-4 up-wind fires do not in-
crease PM10 levels, but we see a significant increase when there are five fires
or more in a month. Down-wind fires show no impact. The results remain
consistent when I increase the buffer radius from 75 km to 100 km. On aver-
age, the higher fire intensity categories increase PM10 by about 3.5 percent
over the sample mean of 98.4 µg/m3.
I present similar sets of results for the impact of up-wind fires on SO2 and
NO2 in the appendix (Appendix Figures 3 and 4, and Tables ). I find
no evidence for the impact of the fires on SO2 levels and limited evidence
for an increase in NO2 levels in the cities. These results for SO2 and NO2
are in contrast to the results reported by Mittal et al. (2009) who find an
increase in the levels of both gases associated with postharvest months when
crop-residue burning occurs. However, their study focused on data from five
monitoring stations around a single city close to crop-residue burning loca-
tions in Punjab. The PM10 and NO2 results here are consistent with those
reported by Rangel and Vogl (2019) who also find that up-wind fires from
sugarcane burning in Brazil increase PM10 but appear to have no effect on
NO2. Overall, the results of the pollution analysis indicate a robust rela-
tion between agricultural fires and PM10 levels measured by the air quality
meters across a large sample of cities across India.
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2.6 Impact on infant outcomes
2.6.1 Descriptive evidence
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics of the outcome variables as well as
some of the key individual and household covariates. Column (1) and (2)
provide the mean and standard deviation for births that are above and be-
low the median number of up-wind fire exposure during the prenatal months.
The median is equivalent to splitting the sample into births with at least one
up-wind fire during the 0 9 months period before birth (about 45 percent
of the sample) and those with zero fires since the median number of fires is
zero. Column (3) presents the summary statistics for the whole sample while
Column (4) presents the differences in means and results of the correspond-
ing t-tests. Column (5) presents t-tests for the differences when we stratify
by district-quarter dummies. For the overall sample, the average mortality
rate measured at one month after birth is 33.4 deaths per 1000 births, and
this increases to 45.25 deaths per 1000 births when mortality is measured at
12 months after birth. These mortality rates are very similar to the statistics
from the Sample Registration System (SRS) which tracks births and death
and is the primary source of vital demographic statistics in India (Bhat,
2002).6 The average infant mortality rate (under 12 months) from the SRS
for the years corresponding to the sample period (2006-2016) is 45.27 (NITI
Aayog, 2018), almost precisely the sample mean in the NFHS data.
The difference in means is indicative of higher mortality rates amongst
births exposed to agricultural fires. The average neonatal and infant mor-
tality rates are both significantly higher for births exposed to at least one
up-wind fire, with 1.97 more neonatal deaths and 2.86 more deaths within 12
months after birth. Both these differences are more than 6 percent of their
respective mean for the total sample. The differences in means remain sig-
nificant in Column (5) which presents the results of the t-test after including
district-by-quarter fixed effects.7
6The SRS undertakes continuous registration of births and deaths for a nationally
representative sample of villages and urban blocks and is updated at a half-yearly period
using surveys for updating and verification of deaths and births.
7The p-values in Column (5) correspond to those obtained by regressing the row vari-
able on the group dummy (0 for below and 1 for above median) and district-by-quarter
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The NFHS 4 also records birth-weights for the individuals born in the five
years prior to the survey. This sample numbers nearly 163,000, about 40
percent of the sample used in the mortality analysis. The birth-weight is re-
ported from a health card or other written record if available. If no record is
available, it is based on the mothers recall of the birth-weight. Previous anal-
ysis of NFHS birth-weights has found that accuracy of recalled weights may
be suspect, with evidence of heaping around multiples of 500 grams (Chan-
non, Padmadas, and McDonald 2011). Given these issues, I look at birth-
weights for the whole sample, as well as for those for whom birth-weight data
is based on written records (about 53 percent of the sample). When differ-
ences between birth-weight are examined for the whole sample, we find that
infants exposed to at least one up-wind fire have a slightly higher birth-weight
on average (about a 0.4 pecent increase over the total sample mean). The
difference in means is not significant when comparing with district-quarter
in Column (5). The difference in means of the birth-weight is significantly
reduced when I limit the birth-weight sample to observations with written
records. I use the birth-weights with written records to classify births that
fall into low birth-weight (LBW) category. LBW individuals are those who
weighed less than 2500 grams at birth (WHO 2014). The overall LBW share
of births is about 17 percent, and there do not appear to be significant dif-
ferences in the mean levels between the two groups.
In addition to the outcome variables, Table 2.3 shows that significant dif-
ferences exist between the two groups in terms of individual and maternal
characteristics. Mothers are slightly older and have about half-a-year of ed-
ucation more amongst those exposed to agricultural fires. The households
are also wealthier, based on the asset-based wealth index that the NFHS
constructs. The asset wealth index is a principal component-based index of
the households ownership of assets such as television, bicycles, the material
used for house construction, the source of drinking water and other factors.
I control for all these covariates in the regression models that I estimate.
These differences in covariates seen in Table 2.3 imply that the location of
agricultural fire activity may not be exogenous and motivates the empirical
dummies. The p-values correspond to the coefficient on the group dummy.
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methodology that I use in the regression estimates below.
2.6.2 Regression estimates
The main effects that I focus on are the impacts of pollution exposure on
neonatal and infant mortality, although I also test for mortality under five
years of age. The first month is believed to be the most vulnerable period
of life, and globally neonatal mortality accounts for more than half of the
total infant deaths (Do et al., 2018). Within the study sample, neonatal
and infant mortality contribute 66.4 and 90.1 percent of the total under-5
mortality respectively. While neonatal and infant mortality do not account
for all potential health costs, their high incidence makes them a substantial
factor in the overall health burden of pollution. I also examine the effect on
birthweight using the sub-sample of births for whom this data is recorded
but find no evidence of any impact on either weight at birth in grams or on
the incidence of low-birthweight (birthweight less than 2500 grams). These
estimates are presented in the Appendix (Tables 4 and 5). I discuss the
mortality effects below.
The first set of results I present consider the impact due to up-wind fire
exposure during each month of the in-utero period, i.e., 0 to 9 months before
birth. The estimation equation is identical to that shown in Equation (2)
except for the addition of month-wise fire count categories for both up- and
down-wind fires. For each month, I categorize the count of fire-pixels in the
up-wind octant into three bins - {0} , [1, 4] , ≥ 5. These categories are con-
sistent with the monthly fire count bins used in the regressions for measuring
PM10 impact. Figure 2.4 presents these results for neonatal and infant mor-
tality. The regressions include month-of-birth dummies, year-of-birth fixed
effects, and cluster-by-quarter fixed effects. Other control variables included
are temperature, precipitation, wind speed and individual and household co-
variates.
The effect on both neonatal and infant mortality is most pronounced during
the later stage of pregnancy from 0 to 2-months before birth. The cumulative
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effect of the up-wind fire coefficients for months 0 to 2 (sum of coefficients
for each month) is 7.99 (s.e = 2.693) for neonatal mortality and 5.40 (s.e
= 3.297) for infant mortality. The higher vulnerability of infants to pollu-
tion exposure during the third trimester of pregnancy and just after birth
is consistent with results found in earlier studies on air pollution and infant
mortality. Biological literature suggests that maternal exposure to partic-
ulate matter and other air pollutants could lead to a decrease oxygen and
nutrient supply to the fetus, and also result in adverse placental inflammation
particularly during the final trimester (Ritz and Wilhelm, 2008; Stieb et al.,
2012). Recent medical literature also hypothesizes that infants in the months
before birth and neonatal stages may be more susceptible to pollution effects
due to alveoli in the lungs being less developed (Hajat et al., 2007). Pre-
vious studies of exposure to biomass fires also find that the late pregnancy
months have a strong effect on birth outcomes and mortality (Rangel and
Vogl, 2019; Jayachandran, 2009). Chay and Greenstone (2003) find that par-
ticulate matter exposure increases mortality the most during the one month
period after birth, and much less in the following one year period during the
early 1980s in the US. They note that evidence for the underlying biological
pathways is unclear. Given these results, I focus on examining the impact
of fire exposure in the late pregnancy months on birth outcomes in further
detail below.
Table 2.4 presents regression results for the impact on neonatal mortal-
ity. Column (1) presents the results of the full sample using a 75 km radius
around each NFHS cluster for measuring fire exposure. Consistent with the
threshold effects seen in the PM10 results, we see no impact when exposed to
four or fewer up-wind fires. Exposure to five or more up-wind fires increases
mortality by more than 2.7 deaths per 1000 births relative to those exposed
to no up-wind fires. Down-wind fires have no significant effect on mortal-
ity rate indicating that the channel through which agricultural fires impact
birth outcomes is most likely through changes in air quality. This increase in
neonatal mortality rate is about 8.1 percent relative to the average sample
neonatal mortality rate of 33.9 deaths per 1000 births.
Table 2.5 presents similar results for the impact on infant mortality. These
results are also consistent with the finding that pollution from agricultural
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fires increases mortality risk. For the full sample (column 1), the magnitude
of the coefficient on five or more up-wind fires increases slightly to 3.0 ad-
ditional deaths compared to the estimates for neonatal mortality. However,
the effect size relative to the mean mortality rate in the sample of 45.4 deaths
per 1000 births is smaller at about 6.7 percent. Note that for these estimates,
I restrict the sample to births that are recorded at least 12 months before
survey date to ensure full exposure. In Table 2.6, I present estimates for
infant mortality from regressions that include fire exposure during the first
year after birth – i.e., during the period from 2 - 12 months after birth. The
effect of in-utero exposure remains unchanged even after accounting for the
post-birth pollution exposure. These results suggest that the mortality risk
is largely driven by pollution exposure that occurs prior to birth or in the
first few weeks after birth rather than later postnatal months.
Table 2.7 shows the effects of in-utero pollution exposure on under-5 mor-
tality. Here again, the negative effects of up-wind fire exposure are large and
significant with around 3.3 additional deaths. Relative to the mean under-
5 mortality rate of 50.2 deaths per 1000 within the sample, the share of
pollution-related deaths linked to agricultural fires remains around 6.6 per-
cent.
To compare these results with the existing literature on pollution expo-
sure, I convert the effects of up-wind fires into mortality effects in terms of
change in pollutant levels. To do so, I divide the coefficient on exposure to
five fires or more in the mortality regressions by the coefficient on the effect
of a similar number of up-wind fires on PM10 from the previous section.
The resulting estimate is analogous to a Wald estimator. I assume that the
marginal impact on PM10 levels estimated using the data from pollution me-
ters from the 250 cities is extensible to the broader geographic region covered
by the NFHS sample of births.Table 6 provides details of these calculations.
The estimates in Table 2.2 show that up-wind fire activity of five or more
fires increase PM10 levels by 3.3 µg/m3 on average. Using a conversion fac-
tor of PM2.5 = 0.7 ∗ PM10 similar to Heft-Neal et al. (2018) results in an
equivalent increase of 2.3 µg/m3 in terms of PM2.5. The effect of a similar
level of up-wind fire activity on infant mortality rate is 3.0 additional deaths
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per 1000 births. This implies that an increase in PM10 levels of 10 µg/m3
would result in an increase in infant mortality rate of 9.0 deaths per 1000
births, more than 20 percent of the mean infant mortality rate of 45.4 deaths
per 1000 births in the sample. A similar increase in PM2.5 levels would im-
ply an increase of nearly 13 deaths per 1000 births, about 28 percent of the
sample mean. These effects are much higher than the infant mortality effect
of 9.2 percent estimated by Heft-Neal et al. (2018) for a selection of African
countries for an increase of 10 µg/m3 in PM2.5. They are also larger than
the 8.8 percent infant mortality estimated in Mexico City (Arceo et al., 2016)
for an increase of 10 µg/m3 in PM10. The impact I find is very similar to
the 19 percent mortality effect for an increase of 10 µg/m3 in PM10 levels
found in China for the 0-4 age group (He et al., 2016). The results that I
find suggest that the mortality risk is likely heightened at the elevated pollu-
tion levels that are typical in developing country contexts such as China and
India. Therefore, estimates from studies in wealthier settings with generally
much lower pollution levels may not be generalizable to low-income settings.
I also take advantage of the nationally representative nature of the data
to present estimates of the total number of deaths attributable to pollution
exposure within the population. I use the mortality numbers for India esti-
mated by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN
IGME, 2018). During the sample period 2006-2016, nearly 1.1 million infant
mortality deaths occur per year on average, and the mean mortality rate is
estimated to 43.4 per 1000 births. I apply the estimated pollution-induced
mortality rate for a 10 unit increase in PM10 or PM2.5 to the population
number of deaths, accounting for the population mortality rate and the frac-
tion of the sample that is exposed to five or more fires (see Appendix Table 6
for details). This calculation results in an estimate of nearly 94,000 (135,000)
additional infant deaths per year attributable to a 10 unit increase in PM10
(PM2.5).
These population mortality estimates can be compared to disease bur-
den model-based estimates that are derived by applying exposure-response
functions to spatial population data. The underlying integrated exposure-
response functions measure the relative risk from ambient PM2.5 exposure
using a theoretical minimum risk exposure level between 2.4 5.9 µg/m3 com-
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pared to the ambient PM2.5 exposure levels derived from annual averages
based on satellite data and chemical transport models (Cohen et al., 2017).
These average ambient exposure levels used for India are in general much
greater than the 10 µg/m3 increase in particulate pollution that I use in
calculating the mortality numbers above. For instance, in 2015 the annual
average PM2.5 value for India was 74.3 µg/m3 and the corresponding num-
ber of under-5 deaths were estimated to be around 51,000 (Lelieveld et al.,
2018) less than 40 percent of the number of under-5 deaths that I find using
the pollution exposure results in this study. I also calculate average infant
and under-5 deaths per annum for the 2006-2016 period using the Global
Burden of Disease tool (Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network,
2017) which also result in much lower estimates compared to the results
that I find. For instance, the GBD estimate of about 70,000 infant deaths
per annum is 52 percent of the estimated mortality burden that I find for a
10 µg/m3 increase in PM2.5 and is closer to the number of deaths that my
results imply for an increase of 5 µg/m3 in PM2.5 (67,000 deaths per annum).
The GBD estimates apply exposure-response functions derived mostly
from urban settings in developed countries and have been found to underes-
timate the mortality impact of pollution in Africa as well (Heft-Neal et al.,
2018). This could be driven by the fact that households in developing coun-
tries are poor and are less likely to adopt avoidance behaviors. Consequently,
the effect of air pollution is expected to be much higher (He et al., 2016; Arceo
et al., 2016). While I cannot directly test whether households engage in avoid-
ance behavior, I present suggestive evidence in the results below by exploring
the heterogeneity in pollution impacts across key population dimensions.
2.6.3 Heterogeneity in pollution effects on mortality
I first explore the difference in the mortality effects of pollution exposure
between urban and rural populations. The urban and rural regions comprise
22 percent and 78 percent of the births respectively in the sample used for
analysis. Column (2) in Tables 2.4 – 2.7 present the regression estimates
for the rural sample, while Column (3) present the same for the urban sam-
ple. The adverse mortality impact of pollution exposure is evident across all
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stages of early childhood in the rural sample, and the magnitude is larger
than the corresponding coefficient on exposure to five or more up-wind fires
seen within the full sample in Column (1). Neonatal mortality increases by
more than 3.1 deaths per 1000 births, infant mortality by 3.6 and under-5
mortality by 4.0. These mortality impacts translate to about 9.0, 7.5 and 7.5
percent of the sample neonatal, infant and under-5 mortality, respectively.
The magnitudes as a share of the sample mean are higher than in the over-
all sample even though the sample average mortality rates are higher in the
rural areas.
In contrast to the heightened adverse effects on mortality in the rural ar-
eas, we do not see any effect on the mortality rates in urban areas due to
up-wind fire exposure (Column 3 in Tables 2.4 – 2.7). Part of the reason is
potentially due to better antenatal and postnatal health care. The NFHS
records several of these indicators for births that occurred within five years
prior to the survey dates, and significant urban-rural differences are visible
in these factors. For instance, 76 percent of the women in urban areas report
receiving any antenatal care from a doctor for their most recent birth, while
the corresponding number amongst rural women is just over 50 percent. The
number of antenatal care visits are also lower amongst rural women. Simi-
larly, while more than 25 percent of rural births were delivered outside of a
hospital (mostly at home), the share of such births among urban women is
less than 12 percent. Delivery at a hospital is more likely to result in a post-
natal check of the health of the infant in the first two days. These checks are
likely to be critical in improving survival rates amongst those born with poor
health conditions (International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and
ICF, 2017).
The coefficients on the down-wind fires have a negative sign, particularly
for the urban sample. Even though these coefficients have wide standard
errors, the point estimates suggest that down-wind fires are potentially asso-
ciated with a reduction in mortality rates. A plausible explanation for this
finding is that overall agricultural fire activity is likely to be correlated with
higher agricultural productivity, and consequently, households in such areas
may have more resources to invest in early childhood health. We see some
evidence for to support this mechanism in Table 2.8. Here, I examine the
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association between total agricultural fire-activity (in the same 0-2 month
before birth period) and indicators of health inputs. I use the data from a
sub-sample of births within five years of the survey date for which the NFHS
records several health input indicators. I find that fire activity is positively
correlated with increased likelihood of institutional births and the mother
having a card provided by a healthcare facility to keep track of the childs
vaccination schedule and growth (Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.8). The
children in areas with higher agricultural fires are also more likely to receive
critical vaccinations in their first year of life (Columns 3 5). These improved
health inputs correlated with fire activity may offset some of the mortality
risk, particularly later in childhood (under-12 months and under-5 mortal-
ity). The sample for which the information is available for these variables is
limited to the most recent birth recorded within the past five years, and the
limited variation across these observations make it difficult to investigate the
potential heterogeneity in mortality effects along these dimensions in greater
detail.
In addition to healthcare availability and access, household wealth level is
an important determinant of infant health outcomes. Panel A of Table 2.9
presents results examining the heterogeneity in mortality effects across house-
hold wealth. The regression specification used here adds interactions between
up-wind fire exposure indicators and wealth level measured by the NFHS
asset wealth index to the specification used earlier. Mortality risk due to
pollution from up-wind fires does not vary with wealth level in the rural
sample either in the neonatal stage or the first one year of life (Columns
1 and 3). However, wealth makes a difference to neonatal mortality in the
urban sample. An increase in household wealth as measured by asset owner-
ship reduces the neonatal mortality risk amongst urban births. This suggests
that the urban poor may be more susceptible to adverse birth outcomes due
to pollution exposure. The remaining results in Table 2.9 examine the het-
erogeneity along other important dimensions. Panel B looks at differences
across gender and Panel C across birth order. Panel D examines if mortality
risk increases for those births whose mothers are engaged in agricultural or
manual labor. In general, the results do not show a consistent pattern in the
variation in mortality risk across these dimensions.
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2.6.4 Robustness tests
Finally, I examine the sensitivity of the main set of results on the effect
of pollution on mortality rates across a variety of robustness tests.The first
set of robustness tests take the form of a placebo regression in which I test
that fires in the months after which mortality is measured do not predict
mortality. For instance, up-wind fires during the second and third month
should not explain mortality in the first month after birth. Similarly, fires
in the 13th and 14th months should not effect infant mortality within the
first 12 months after birth. Table 2.10 presents the results of these tests for
neonatal and infant mortality. The regression specification are identical to
the previous specifications excpet for the inclusion of fire counts for the lead
months as well. The coefficients on up-wind fires for the lead months are
not statistically significant across the outcomes. Second, I also examine the
sensitivity of the main estimates when the buffer used to measure fire counts
is increased to 100 kilometers in Table 2.11. The results for the effect of
up-wind fires on mortality remain consitent with those found earlier using a
75 kilometer buffer.
I also test the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications in Ta-
ble 2.12. Columns (1) and (4) presents results from using an alternative set
of fixed effects which flexibly control for state-specific seasonal effects and
district-specific time trends along with month and birth-year effects. The
coefficients show that neonatal and infant mortality effects remain consistent
with the results from the preferred specification presented in earlier tables.
Columns (2) and (4) show estimates from using mother fixed effects. This
specification compares outcomes for siblings born to the same mother but
having different levels of up-wind fire exposure. The results remain very
similar to the results using cluster-by-quarter fixed effects. In columns (3)
and (6), I also show that the estimates in the main specification are robust
to clustering by district rather than at the cluster level. Overall, these ad-
ditional tests provide added validity to the pollution impacts found in the
study.
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2.7 Conclusions
This study examines the adverse health consequences of in-utero pollution
exposure on early childhood outcomes. The identification strategy uses sea-
sonal variation in agricultural fires, a widespread practice among farmers in
India as well as other parts of the developing world. To overcome the lack
of ground-based measures of agricultural fires, I utilize satellite-derived data
on the location and timing of agricultural fires at a high degree of spatial
and temporal resolution. I combine the fire activity data with georeferenced
daily pollution meter measurements from more than 250 Indian cities to first
establish the impact of agricultural fires on levels of airborne particulates. I
then leverage the birth history data of all women interviewed in the National
Family and Health Survey (NFHS 4) to construct a panel of births and deaths
at the month-by-year level for each NFHS sample cluster. Using these data,
I then estimate the effect of exposure to agricultural fires on mortality and
health outcomes at infancy. In both analyses, I exploit the variation in wind
direction and isolate exposure to fires that are up-wind of the pollution meter
or the household. This allows me to disentangle the potential income effect
due to higher agricultural productivity or other economic activities that may
be correlated with higher fire incidence. I show that both pollution and in-
fant health are affected by fires that are up-wind, while down-wind fires have
no effect.
The results show that up-wind fire activity has a significant effect on PM10
levels in the sample of Indian cities used in the analysis. Months that have
5 or more fires result in an average increase in PM10 levels of more than
3.3 µg/m3 – nearly 20 percent of the safe limit of prescribed by the World
Health Organization (WHO). Rather surprisingly, this large impact of fires
on PM10 levels is seen even though the average PM10 levels are already
very high (mean of 98.4 µg/m3) in the sample. These results are consistent
with those seen in previous studies in India, primarily in the environmental
and atmospheric science literature, and those examining sugarcane burning
in Brazil (Venkataraman et al., 2006; Mittal et al., 2009; Rangel and Vogl,
2019).
The most potent effects of agricultural fire exposure on infant outcomes are
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seen in the higher likelihood of mortality across early childhood. Mortality
rates within one month after birth (neonatal mortality) and during the first
12 months (infant mortality) show a significant increase with exposure to
agricultural fires. I also find that the in-utero pollution exposure has lasting
effects even up to five years of age. The mortality effects of agricultural fire
exposure range between 6 to 8 percent relative to the sample mean. These ef-
fects are concentrated in rural households, while the effect is relatively muted
in urban areas. Differences is health care access as well household wealth may
be potential factors underlying these differential effects.
At the aggregate, nationwide level, the results of this study imply more
than 93,000 (133,000) additional infant deaths per year attributable to a
10 unit increase in PM10 (PM2.5). These estimates signify a much larger
mortality cost of pollution exposure than previously thought. For instance,
recent studies estimate about 51,000 under-5 deaths in India attributable
to ambient air-pollution risk during 2015 (Lee and Kim, 2018) - less than
40 percent of the number of under-5 deaths that I find using the pollution
exposure results in this study.
The results of this study add to the growing literature on air pollution
and health. Unlike most previous studies in this area, this paper focuses
on pollution from non-industrial, non-urban sources of pollution. I build
upon previous research by improving measurement of exposure to the fires
combining detailed georeferenced survey and satellite datasets. The large
sample of births in the data also makes it possible to provide analysis at a
much greater geographic scale, encompassing both urban and rural areas in
the country. These results also highlight the public health implications of
agricultural fires and the need for feasible policies to reduce such practices
among farmers. Addressing the issue of crop-residue burning is going to
be challenging since the expansion of mechanized harvesting through use of
combined harvesters appears to be one of the drivers (Gupta, 2012; Kumar
et al., 2015). In recent years, there has been an increased focus on finding
solutions for reducing crop-residue burning. Initial attempts, starting in
2015, to place a ban on any residue burning failed (Down to Earth, 2017).
Later, starting in 2018, the government in the state of Punjab has initiated
policies to promote direct seeding machinery that can circumvent the need
35
for clearing the residue from the field before planting, as well as subsidies for
other residue management technologies (ET Bureau, 2018). The potential
for these policies to reduce the practice of crop-residue burning and their
health impact remains an important issue for research.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Agricultural fire activity (2006 - 2016)
(a) February to June
Legend
Fire count
0 - 638
639 - 1865
1866 - 4241
4242 - 8713
8714 - 14735

0 525 1,050262.5 Kilometers
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Figure 2.1: (cont.) Agricultural fire activity (2006 - 2016)
(b) September to January
Legend
Fire count
0 - 464
465 - 1731
1732 - 4388
4389 - 9826
9827 - 18931

0 525 1,050262.5 Kilometers
Note: Fire counts per district based on FIRMS data (National Aeronautics and Space
Admnistration (NASA), 2018)
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Figure 2.2: Weekly variation in PM10 levels and agricultural fires within
100 km radius during 2015
Note: Number of fires is the confidence-weighted average number of fires in the up-wind
octant around each city, for each week, based on MODIS fire counts. PM10 level based
on air quality meter data from a sample of 257 cities, averaged by week.
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Figure 2.3: Impact of up-wind fires on PM10 (µg per m3): Plot of
regression coefficients
(a)
(b)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Estimates shown from the
regression of PM10 on number of up-wind fires. Reference category is zero up-wind fires.
Sample is monthly air- quality meter data 2013-15 for 257 cities. All specifications
include month FE, quarter-by-year FE, city-by-year FE, similar category dummies for
fires in down-wind octant, number of fires in non-up/down-wind directions, and monthly
mean temperature, precipitation and wind speed.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of up-wind fires in each in utero months on neonatal
and infant mortality (deaths per 1000 births)
(a) Neonatal mortality
(b) Infant mortality
Note: Graphs show the coefficient on variable that takes value 1 if individual was
exposed to more than four fires in that month. Standard errors are clustered at the
NFHS sample cluster level. Cumulative effect for months 0 to 2 (sum of coefficients for
each month) is 7.99 (s.e = 2.693) for panel (a) and 5.40 (s.e = 3.297) for panel (b).
Sample consists of all births recorded from January 2007 to August 2016. Specification
includes controls for non up-wind fires, temperature, rainfall, wind speed and individual,
maternal and household characteristics. All specifications also include month of birth
FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE. Estimates based on 75 km buffer
around each cluster for computing fire counts.
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Table 2.2. Impact of fires on PM10 ( µ g per m3 )
(1) (2)
75 km 100 km
Up-wind fires:
1-4 0.0928 -0.2679
(0.8385) (0.8647)
≥ 5 3.3253∗∗∗ 3.4091∗∗∗
(1.1660) (0.9516)
Down-wind fires:
1-4 0.4591 1.4256
(0.8267) (0.8649)
≥ 5 -0.2947 0.7947
(1.2404) (1.1490)
Dep. var. mean 98.39 98.39
Observations 7277 7277
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of average monthly air quality
meter readings from 257 cities for 2013 - 2015. Standard errors clustered at city level (N
= 257). Control variables include temperature, precipitation, wind speed and number of
fires in non up-wind or down-wind direction. All specifications include month FE, year
FE, and city-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.3. Summary of mortality rate, maternal and individual
characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Above median Below median Total Difference Difference
Variable Mean/[SE] Mean/[SE] Mean/[SE] (1)-(2) (1)-(2)
Neonatal mortality (deaths per 1000 births) 34.422 32.449 33.343 1.973*** 1.973**
[0.477] [0.423] [0.330]
Infant mortality (deaths per 1000 births) 46.811 43.952 45.248 2.859*** 2.859**
[0.559] [0.494] [0.389]
Birth weight (g) 2823.863 2812.383 2817.452 11.480*** 11.48
[2.682] [2.414] [1.947]
N 71835 90858 162693
Birth weight (g) written record 2820.194 2819.355 2819.726 0.839 0.839
[3.319] [2.965] [2.348]
N 38321 48428 86749
Share - low birth-weight (< 2500 g) 0.167 0.168 0.168 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
N 38321 48428 86749
Total children ever born 3.017 3.022 3.02 -0.005 -0.005
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Mother’s age 29.462 29.238 29.34 0.224*** 0.224***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.016]
Maternal education (years) 5.629 5.174 5.381 0.455*** 0.455***
[0.025] [0.024] [0.022]
Household head is female = 1 0.111 0.12 0.116 -0.009*** -0.009**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age of household head 44.221 44.003 44.102 0.218*** 0.218
[0.055] [0.051] [0.044]
Child is twin 0.024 0.024 0.024 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Sex of child (girl = 1) 0.472 0.476 0.474 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Wealth index category (1 5) 2.684 2.502 2.585 0.182*** 0.182***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
N 182415 219853 402268
Clusters 25972 27078 27997
District-by-quarter FE No Yes
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The value displayed for t-tests are the
differences in the means across the groups. Standard errors are clustered at NFHS sample
cluster level. Sample consists of all births recorded from January 2007 to August 2016.
Groups based on median of up-wind fires within 75 km radius during prenatal months (0
9 months prior to birth). The median value is zero fires.
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Table 2.4. Impact on neonatal mortality (75 km buffer)
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 0.283 0.244 0.486
(1.0020) (1.1243) (2.1856)
≥ 5 2.757∗∗ 3.158∗∗ 1.016
(1.2848) (1.4467) (2.7848)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -0.368 0.055 -2.350
(1.0058) (1.1380) (2.0985)
≥ 5 1.022 1.849 -2.757
(1.3047) (1.4792) (2.7105)
Dep. var. mean 33.93 35.55 27.70
Observations 385234 305474 79760
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
January 2007 to August 2016. Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual died
within one month of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months before
birth, and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer around
each sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster
level (N = 27997). Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education
level, asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth
order, and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires
in other directions, temperature, rainfall and windspeed. All specifications include month
of birth FE, birth year FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.5. Impact on infant mortality (75 km buffer)
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 0.391 0.799 -1.442
(1.2540) (1.4017) (2.7852)
≥ 5 3.002∗ 3.559∗∗ 0.511
(1.5914) (1.7867) (3.4961)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -1.544 -1.318 -2.646
(1.2317) (1.3910) (2.5849)
≥ 5 0.338 1.082 -2.892
(1.6046) (1.8137) (3.3719)
Dep. var. mean 45.44 48.09 35.79
Observations 365589 286960 78629
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
January 2007 to November 2015 (births recorded at least 12 months before survey date
to ensure full exposure). Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual died within
one year of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months before birth,
and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer around each
sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster level
(N = 27997). Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education level,
asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth order,
and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires in
other directions, temperature, rainfall and windspeed. All specifications include month of
birth FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.6. Impact on infant mortality with controls for post-birth fire
exposure(75 km buffer)
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 0.410 0.784 -1.431
(1.2545) (1.4021) (2.7891)
≥ 5 3.108∗ 3.601∗∗ 0.589
(1.6035) (1.8013) (3.5132)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -1.501 -1.311 -2.485
(1.2336) (1.3934) (2.5875)
≥ 5 0.477 1.276 -3.087
(1.6210) (1.8315) (3.4097)
Dep. var. mean 45.44 48.09 35.79
Observations 365589 286960 78629
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
January 2007 to November 2015 (births recorded at least 12 months before survey date
to ensure full exposure). Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual died within
one year of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months before birth,
and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer around each
sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster level
(N = 27997). Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education level,
asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth order,
and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires in
other directions, temperature, rainfall and windspeed for the period 0-2 months before
birth. and for the months 1 - 12 after birth. All specifications include month of birth FE,
year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.7. Impact on under-5 mortality (75 km buffer)
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 1.047 1.195 0.584
(1.2540) (1.4080) (2.7199)
≥ 5 3.272∗∗ 4.002∗∗ 0.302
(1.5319) (1.7328) (3.2149)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -1.970 -1.838 -2.570
(1.2348) (1.3887) (2.6594)
≥ 5 -2.011 -1.178 -5.614∗
(1.5255) (1.7255) (3.2015)
Dep. var. mean 50.19 53.40 38.55
Observations 402268 315437 86831
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
January 2007 to August 2016. Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual died
within 5 years of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months before
birth, and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer around
each sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster
level (N = 27997). Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education
level, asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth
order, and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires
in other directions, temperature, rainfall and windspeed. All specifications include month
of birth FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.9. Heterogeneous impacts of fires on mortality
Neonatal mortality Infant mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Panel A: Interaction with wealth
1 4 Wealth index -0.7116 -3.1545 -0.5818 -2.6780
(1.1458) (2.3399) (1.4297) (2.4871)
≥ 5 Wealth index -0.6803 -4.4999∗ -1.5436 -3.7991
(1.2061) (2.3477) (1.4944) (2.5401)
Panel B: Interaction with gender
1− 4 × Female -0.7591 -0.8678 -0.2006 -1.8736
(1.8628) (3.4990) (2.2910) (3.7595)
≥ 5 × Female 0.1483 -4.6387 0.2084 -5.5109∗
(1.7741) (3.0776) (2.1919) (3.2849)
Panel C: Interaction with birth order
1− 4 × Second child -3.1086 -2.6808 -4.0092 -0.6146
(2.3747) (3.8436) (2.8872) (4.2011)
1− 4 × Higher order -2.8501 5.7740 -5.1128∗ 6.8220
(2.3792) (4.5723) (2.8567) (4.9038)
≥ 5 × Second child -4.9074∗∗ 0.6938 -3.8929 0.3636
(2.1869) (3.5973) (2.6587) (3.8615)
≥ 5 × Higher order -0.9741 1.2756 -0.6959 2.0535
(2.2731) (4.1005) (2.7472) (4.4324)
Panel D: Interaction with mother working in agricultural or manual labor
1− 4 × Ag. or manual labor 3.9082 -25.1869 4.3845 -6.0537
(5.3243) (25.5129) (6.4090) (31.6271)
≥ 5 × Ag. or manual labor 5.0556 -4.1928 6.5457 22.5895
(5.3137) (21.8333) (6.5202) (28.7893)
Dep. var. mean 35.18 26.67 48.09 38.55
Observations 315437 86831 286960 78629
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Notes: Standard errors are clustered at
the NFHS sample cluster level (N = 27997). Fire exposures is measured for the period
0-2 months before birth using a 75 km buffer. Only the interaction terms are presented
for brevity. Control variables include individual and household controls, temperature,
precipitation, windspeed and fires in other directions. All specifications also include month
of birth FE, year-of-birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.10. Placebo tests using fires in subsequent months
(1) (2)
Neonatal mortality Infant mortality
In-utero fires:
1− 4 0.2593 0.4062
(1.0012) (1.2545)
≥ 5 2.7071∗∗ 3.0533∗
(1.2872) (1.5941)
Fire lead 2 months:
1− 4 -0.2667 0.7983
(1.0074) (1.2500)
≥ 5 -1.5985 0.6939
(1.4209) (1.7713)
Dep. var. mean 33.93 33.92
Observations 385234 346462
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded
from January 2007 to August 2016. Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual
died within one month of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months
before birth, and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer
around each sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample
cluster level (N = 27997). Fires lead correspond to up-wind fires in the first and second
month after birth for neonatal mortality and the 13 and 14 months for infant mortality,
respectively. Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education level,
asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth order,
and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires in
down-wind and in other directions, temperature and rainfall. All specifications include
month of birth FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 2.11. Impact on mortality rates (100 km buffer)
(1) (2) (3)
Neonatal Infant Under-5
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 1.032 1.142 1.047
(1.0283) (1.2796) (1.2540)
≥ 5 2.828∗∗ 2.856∗ 3.272∗∗
(1.2665) (1.5604) (1.5319)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -0.527 -2.576∗∗ -1.970
(1.0231) (1.2715) (1.2348)
≥ 5 0.233 -2.342 -2.011
(1.2567) (1.5494) (1.5255)
Dep. var. mean 33.93 45.44 50.19
Observations 385234 365589 402268
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
January 2007 to August 2016. Dependent variables takes value 1000 if individual died
within 5 years of birth. Number of fires are measured for the period 0-2 months before
birth, and up- vs. down-wind based on octants (45 degree sectors) of the buffer around
each sample cluster location. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster
level (N = 27997). Control variables include maternal age at birth, mother’s education
level, asset-based wealth index, religion, gender of household head, gender of birth, birth
order, and indicators for multiple births (twins or more). Regressions also control for fires
in other directions, temperature, rainfall and windspeed. All specifications include month
of birth FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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CHAPTER 3
FARMER-TRADER RELATIONS AND
RETURNS TO GRAIN QUALITY IN
INFORMAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
Do informal contracts provide incentives for improving product quality? An-
swering this question is particularly important in the context of rural agricul-
tural markets where long-term, informal contracts are pervasive, with farm-
ers usually selling their crop to the same trader over an extended period
(Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Songsermsawas et al., 2016). In theory, when
parties do not behave opportunistically, long-term relationships and reputa-
tions can serve as an informal enforcement mechanism and provide mutually
efficient product quality (Macleod, 2007). However, village-level traders in
developing countries typically enjoy a combination of market power and bet-
ter information about desirable product quality attributes higher up the value
chain. Farmers often lack outside options and alternate channels through
which they can sell their crops. As a result, traders could engage in rent-
seeking behavior, and as a result, farmers may receive sub-optimal returns for
grain quality. On the other hand, past literature also suggests that middle-
men contribute to risk-sharing, reduce transaction costs and provide access to
complementary markets such as inputs and credit (Subramanian and Qaim,
2011). Under such conditions, traders may benefit from providing incentives
to sellers for better quality. The availability (or the lack) of quality incen-
tives under current agricultural market systems has important implications
for linking smallholder farmers in developing countries to modern supply
chains, addressing food quality and safety issues and promoting adoption of
quality-enhancing technologies.
However, limited evidence exists on quantifying the value of quality in
agricultural markets, particularly for staples such as wheat, maize and other
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grains which account for the overwhelming majority of farm output in devel-
oping countries. In this paper we examine two interrelated questions. First,
do farmers receive incentives for improved quality in primary agricultural
markets or do traders appropriate the returns to quality for staple grains?
Second, how do farmer-trader relations affect the premiums for quality of-
fered to farmers?
Empirical estimation of the impact of grain quality on price received by
farmers faces multiple challenges. Long-standing personal relationships often
result from multiple sources such as kinship, reciprocity, indebtedness arising
from inter-linked markets for credit and labor in villages (Subramanian and
Qaim, 2011). These underlying factors are endogenously linked to farmers’
production and management decisions that determine output quality. Po-
tential selection bias also arises due to endogeneity in the famers production
and grain management decisions (choice of varieties, inputs and postharvest
practices that may affect final quality of grain) as well as their choice of
whom and when to sell their grain. These factors are typically unobserved
by researchers. Previous studies have sought to apply hedonic-pricing models
to investigate the equilibrium relationship between price and product char-
acteristics to measure returns to quality in agricultural markets (Fafchamps
et al., 2008). However, these methods may be inaccurate in developing coun-
try settings wherein competitive market conditions may not exist. Traders’
may enjoy market power and also have better information about market
prices and quality demand higher up the value chain. Additionally, farmers
and traders typically engage in repeated transactions every season and rela-
tional factors can contribute to price distortions and premiums in addition
to product attributes that affect quality.
In this study we use a novel field experiment in the state of Bihar, India to
measure the quality premium that traders offer for wheat and maize farmers
that overcomes potential endogeneity issues. Farmers in the experiment are
provided with pre-tested grain samples that they carry and show to traders
in their village while posing as potential sellers of the grain. Each farmer
shows a high and a low-quality sample of both maize and wheat. The farmer
asks the trader for the price they are willing to offer for a fixed quantity of
grain of each sample. Identical grain samples are given to all farmers across
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sample villages, and the price offers are elicited from traders by the farmers
within the same week. Thus, the experimental design allows to exogenously
fix the grain quality characteristics and estimate the price premiums for bet-
ter quality maize and wheat. Crucially, this methodology allows us to infer
the quality premia accounting for any unobserved market power and farmer-
trader relational factors.
Our results indicate that farmers receive a 4 percent premium in the price
for improved grain quality. In the Bihar context, this quality premium is
equivalent to increasing the physical grain yield by about 5 percent per unit
of land. We also combine this data from the farmer experiment with survey
information on the relationship between farmer-trader pairs as well village
level market competition. Using these data, we find that the premium for
high quality increases for farmers who repeatedly sell to the same trader.
These results suggests that traders may be offering a higher quality premium
as an incentive to retain farmers who are existing customers, and may explain
why farmers typically do not switch traders in many developing country
agricultural markets (Mitra et al., 2018; Songsermsawas et al., 2015).
A second part of our study incorporates grain samples identical to those
shown by the farmers in the framed field experiment above within a choice
experiment implemented by research staff with the traders. The prices that
traders report to farmers posing as potential sellers in the experiment reflect
their usual offers to farmers, while the choice experiment elicits the traders
true valuation for the grain of the same quality. Combining these data, we
exploit the relative difference in the prices offered to farmers for high versus
low-quality grain versus the traders’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for identical
quality differential (from the choice experiment) to estimate the extent of
information rents that traders can extract in this setting. Our estimates
show that farmers receive only $0.80 for a potential $1 payoff for improved
grain quality. These results may help shed light why farmgate prices have
been found to be low and unresponsive in many contexts, and as a result,
limit agricultural growth (Mitra et al., 2018). Understanding the barriers
to optimal payoffs for quality also has implications for famer investments in
quality-enhancing and preserving technology as well as food safety issues.
This study adds to the limited literature on the effect of quality character-
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istics on prices received by smallholder farmers in poor, developing countries.
The results are consistent with those reported in a previous study on price
discounts for insect damage in maize in Benin where the authors find that a
10 percent increase in insect damage results in a price discount in the range
of 3 - 9 percent (Kadjo et al., 2016). The findings also provide support for
the use of returns to quality in the market as an incentive for promoting ef-
fective production and postharvest technologies for smallholder farmers that
can improve and preserve grain quality attributes.
3.2 Experimental design
We carried out the framed field experiment in a sample of villages across four
districts in the state of Bihar, India after the winter (rabi) harvest during
May-June 2016. Before the experiment, we administered a baseline survey
to a random sample of households in each village. We also compiled a census
listing of all grain traders operating in these villages and interviewed them
in the baseline survey . In total, our baseline survey sample consists of 3200
households and 107 traders. Data from the baseline survey allows us to cre-
ate farmer-trader pairs in each village matched by their transaction history.
We recruit a sample of farmers in each village from our baseline sample to
carry pre-tested samples of grains to the traders in their village posing as po-
tential sellers. The methodology used here is similar to the mystery shopper
methodology used in marketing studies, particularly in settings evaluating
the quality of service delivery (Wilson, 1998). The key aspect of our ex-
periment is that all farmer show identical grain samples of the same quality
in the experiment. Each farmer offers a high and low-quality sample of the
grain end elicits the price that the trader is willing to offer for each. The
farmers show the same samples to all the traders operating in their village.
These features of the experimental design allow us to overcome potential
selection issues and estimate the returns to grain quality that are available
to the farmers in the market. In addition to this framed field experiment,
a second part of our study incorporates the same grain samples shown by
farmers above in a choice experiment implemented by research staff with the
traders. Our empirical strategy exploits the relative difference in prices for
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varying grain quality between prices offered to farmers and those reported
by the trader to the research staff in the choice experiment to estimate the
extent of information rents that traders can extract in this setting. We de-
scribe the experiment protocol and the estimation strategy in greater detail
below.
3.2.1 Grain samples selection
We procure a variety of wheat and maize grains from farmers in one of the
villages that are not in our sample but close to our study area in Samstipur
district. These were mixed, and hand sorted by research staff to create grain
samples that varied in size, color and level of impurities. We also introduce
variation in the level of grain moisture across the samples by additional dry-
ing or moistening as required. They were then shown to a focus group of
grain traders at a nearby village market (who were not part of our sample).
Traders were asked to gauge the level of various quality attributes for each
sample, rank them from best to worst and report the price that they would
offer for each. Traders in the focus group also confirmed that these grain sam-
ples were broadly representative of the quality of grains that farmers sold in
these markets. We used the feedback from this exercise to narrow the pool
of grain samples to six samples each for wheat and maize. Identical batches
of these samples were used by the field investigators simultaneously across
the sample villages. When not in use the samples were stored in hermetically
sealed bags to ensure that grain moisture and quality remained constant for
the duration of the field experiment.
3.2.2 “Mystery seller” experiment
In each study village, we recruited a sample of farmers to take a few sam-
ples of grain, varying in quality, to the traders in the village and ask each
trader what price they would offer for this grain. Both traders and farmers
reported in discussions before the experiment that it is a widespread practice
for farmers to take samples of their grain to traders and check for the price.
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Farmers also have multiple plots of land with varying levels of soil conditions,
productivity and drainage features. Input use and crop management differ
across these plots as well, and it is not unusual for the same farmer to have
an output of varying quality for the same crop.
The sampling of farmers for this experiment was carried out in the follow-
ing manner. We asked each household in the baseline survey to provide a list
of three traders to whom they sold their grain most frequently. Using this in-
formation, we create a list of farmers in our sample who sell most frequently
to each trader in the village. This list of matched trader-farmer pairs serves
as a sampling frame from which we randomly select one potential farmer
participant for each trader. Thus, a total of 98 farmers (equal to the number
of traders) were selected.The number of farmer participants in each village
was equal to the number of traders in that village. Farmers who agreed to
participate were offered a small remuneration in the form of mobile phone
talk time. In 93 percent of cases, our first choice of the farmer was willing
to participate. In cases were the first choice was not willing to participate a
second farmer was randomly selected from the remaining list.
Each farmer participant was given two samples of wheat and maize which
they then carried to all the traders in the village. The grain samples used
here were those that had received the highest and lowest quality ranking in
the focus group exercise. These samples were also part of the six samples
that were shown to the trader later in the choice experiment conducted by
research personnel. Various steps were taken to minimize the possibility that
a trader’s offer to the farmer in the experiment differed from the usual price
at which they would have purchased the same grain in an actual sale. Farm-
ers within the same village carried out the exercise on different days within
the same week. Traders were approached for the choice experiment by the
research staff only after all the farmers had finished. The packaging used
varied across farmers. They were asked to provide us with the bags (plastic
or other material) in which they would usually carry samples of their grain
to show traders in the market. Farmers were asked not to mention that the
samples were provided to them by the research team.
Each farmer went to every trader individually at their shop and not ac-
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companied by any research personnel. The farmer was instructed to inform
the trader that they had some maize and wheat from two different plots of
land that they were considering selling. He would then show each sample to
the trader and ask what price he could get for it. All farmers were asked
to report around the same quantity of grain available for sale in case the
trader asked (the quantity is fixed at the mean volume of grain sold in each
transaction as reported in the baseline: 8 bags or 400 kg 50 kg). Farmers
could bargain over the price only if that were their usual practice in their
interaction with the trader. After receiving the quotes from the trader, the
farmer would report back to the research staff who would make a note of the
prices offered for each sample. The farmer would then go to the next traders
shop to repeat the process. At the end of the exercise, we administered a
brief survey to the farmers in which we collected information on their past
transactions and other economic or social interactions with each trader.
3.2.3 Traders choice experiment
Village level grain traders identified in the baseline census who dealt with
maize and wheat participated in the choice experiment. Field investigators
(FIs) informed the traders that they were part of a research study. The FIs
showed the traders six samples of each grain and asked a series of questions.
These samples included the two samples that were used in the mystery-seller
experiment. The order of samples shown within each crop (maize/wheat)
was random with the FIs aware of the sample number for data recording
purposes. Each trader was asked to rate the grain size and color on a three-
point scale and asked to estimate the percentage of impurities and moisture
level for every sample. They were also asked to report the price at which
they would purchase a certain amount of grain identical to the quality shown
in the sample to measure their willingness-to-pay (WTP), and the price they
would expect to get if they sold the same to their usual buyer as measure
of their willingness-to-accept (WTA). We also collected data on the highest
and lowest prices that the trader had offered for maize and wheat in the past
two market days. We use the traders WTP elicited in the choice experiment
to compare with the prices that they offer to farmers, holding quality con-
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stant across both transactions. This allows us to measure the surplus that
traders gain in their transactions with farmers due to the lack of competitive
conditions that exist in informal agricultural markets.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We conducted a baseline survey across a sample of 64 randomly selected dis-
tricts, stratified across four districts in the state of Bihar. From these 64
villages, we exclude villages that are close to large markets or urban areas in
which a significant share of the farmers sell their output outside of the vil-
lage and villages where the presence of maize and wheat cultivation is limited.
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the villages in the samples. A village sur-
vey was used to collect aggregate, village-level information on demographic
characteristics, infrastructure, agricultural activities, and markets through
interviews with village officials, community leaders, and groups of farmers,
and from official records. On average, each village had about 5.5 markets
in which farmers from the village carried out transactions. The number of
markets within 10 kilometers is lower - about 1.5 permanent and 1.5 weekly
markets. Most of the farmers in the village sell their wheat and maize to
grain traders who have operations in the village, and a smaller number also
sell in local markets within or near the village. On average, the number of
grain traders operating in the village is about 2.3, indicating that the grain
markets in these villages are likely to be concentrated.
As mentioned earlier, we carried out a baseline survey of 50 farm house-
holds within each village as well as a census of all the traders who operated
in these villages. From each of these villages in the study, we recruit farmers
from the baseline sample for participating in the mystery-seller experiment
using the sampling procedure described in the previous section. We exclude
those traders who report that they do not transact in maize or wheat in the
baseline census. Our final sample for the experiment consists of 98 traders
and an equal number of farmers. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the main
descriptive characteristics of the participants in the experiment.
Panel A of Table 2 describes the sample of farmers recruited. The farm-
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ers have a mean age of 50 years with around 8.5 years of education and a
household size of just over five members on average. The wheat and maize
yields reported by the farmers for their most recent season are 2.4 tons per
hectare (ha) and 3.7 tons per ha, respectively. These are slightly higher than
the state average yields of 2.2 tons per ha for wheat and 3.6 tons per ha
for maize for the 2015-16 season (Directorate of Economics and Statistics,
2016). Farmers in the sample mainly sell to just one trader in the village.
On average, the number of sale transactions per farmer is slightly more than
two for wheat and about 1.7 for maize. They have small landholdings with
an average farm size of 0.56 hectare consistent with the overall farm size
structure in Bihar where more than 90 percent of the farms are less than 1
hectare in size based on a census of agricultural holdings carried out in 2011
(Department of Agriculture). These farms are also fragmented, with each
farmer having nearly 3.8 plots on average. Discussions with farmers in the
sample show that these plots usually differ in their quality of soil, access to
irrigation and other features that could determine grain quality. As a result,
farmers tend to produce grains that can significantly differ in quality across
plots. We explicitly incorporate this fact in the script followed by farmers
in the mystery-seller experiment to lend credibility for the farmers providing
grain samples of two different quality to the traders to elicit their offer price.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the trader characteristics based on the data
from the census of traders. The traders in the sample are slightly younger
than the farmers on average (mean age of 44.6 years) and have a higher
number of years of education on average (9.3 years). They have considerable
experience working as traders, with over 15 years on average. More than
three-fourths of the traders also have a farm of their own. They sell grain
to a variety of customers. Most of them (83 percent) work as aggregators
engaged in selling the grain to other larger traders. These large traders are
usually located close to nearby urban or transportation hubs and buy in
large volumes that most farmers are unable to produce on their own. Some
of the traders also sell directly to mills or feed manufacturers (22 and 18
percent, respectively), while a smaller percentage (11 percent) also report
selling grains to retail consumers (households).
Traders are asked to provide an estimate of the volumes of maize and wheat
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that they procure per month, during the peak season. Using the volumes re-
ported by all the traders in the census, we calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman
indices (HHI) of market power for each village. HHI is the sum of the squared
market shares of the traders in each village. On average; we find an HHI of
about 0.45 for both maize and wheat. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index above
0.25 generally indicates a high concentration market in the United States
(U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trader Commission, 2010). The
high degree of concentration appears to be consistent with the small number
of traders per village seen in Table 3.1.
At the time of the mystery-seller experiment, we administer a brief survey
to ask the farmers information about their past transactions and social in-
teractions that they have with each trader in the experiment. We use this
information to examine whether farmer-trader relations affect the quality
premia offered to farmers. Table 3.3 reports these the summary statistics for
the relationship variables for the farmer-trader pairs. In total, we have 202
farmer-trader pairs.
In 51 percent of the cases, the trader is someone the farmer has sold to
in the past year. We also find that the farmers in 42 percent of the cases
have had some form of social interactions with the trader which involved
the exchange of gifts during festivals, weddings or other social occasions. 47
percent of the farmers also talk to the trader regarding information about
market prices. Only in about 13 percent of the cases do farmers report that
the trader pays the full amount for the grains at the time of purchase, while
most of the traders take up to two weeks to pay the farmer. Most traders
do not pay for transport, nor do they offer credit or sell agricultural inputs.
As a result, it is unlikely that farmers sell to a trader because they have
provided agricultural inputs or financing to the farmer. This implies that
informal contracts between farmers and traders in our sample are likely to
be based on past transactions and social relationships rather than financial
ties.
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3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Estimating quality premium received by farmers
We first examine the quality premia that farmers receive based on the prices
offered to them by traders in the mystery-seller experiment. The experimen-
tal design used here lends itself to a straightforward empirical strategy to
estimate the quality premia that farmers receive for their grains. Our main
estimating equation is of the following form:
pi,t,s = β0 + β1Hi,t,s + λi,t + εi,t,s (3.1)
where pi,t,s is the price offered by trader t to farmer i for grain sample
s. Hi,t,s is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the sample shown is
of high-quality. By design Hi,t,s is uncorrelated with εi,t,s. In addition, we
include farmer-trader pair fixed effects λi,t. The pair fixed effects absorb any
grain quality invariant unobserved factors that are specific to each farmer-
trader pair such as the distance between them, traders past knowledge of the
quality of grain that the farmer usually produces, and other invariant his-
torical relationship variables. β1 measures the difference between the prices
offered by the trader for the high and low-quality samples - a measure of
the returns to quality that a farmer earns. We then extend Equation 3.1
to examine some of the determinants of the quality premia that a farmer is
offered by including an interaction of the high-quality sample indicator with
a vector of farmer-trader relationship characteristics:
pi,t,s = β0 + β1Hi,t,s + δ
′
(Hi,t,s ×Xi,t) + λi,t + εi,t,s (3.2)
where Xi,t is a vector of farmer-trader pair specific variables, while the
remaining variables are similar to those in Equation 3.1.
3.4.2 Estimating information-rents captured by traders
To examine the divergence between traders own valuation of the grain quality
and the prices that they offer to farmers, we combine observations from the
mystery-seller experiment with the data on traders stated purchase prices for
identical grain samples in the choice experiment. Our estimation strategy
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uses a simple difference-in-difference type regression of the following form:
pi,t,s = β0 + β1Di=farmer + β2Ds=high (3.3)
+ β3Di=farmer ×Ds=highλt + µv + εi,t
where Di=farmer = 1 if the observation corresponds to a price offer made to
a farmer in the mystery-seller experiment. The variable takes the value 0 if it
corresponds to the traders stated price in the choice experiment. Ds=high = 1
iis a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the grain sample shown was the
high quality sample and 0 if it is a low quality sample. λt and µv are trader
and village level fixed effects, respectively. The trader fixed effects control for
their market power, ability to assess quality characteristics and other unob-
served trader characteristics. The village level fixed effects serve as controls
for the villages market structure, access and other village-specific features
that may affect traders valuation and prices offered to farmer for their grain.
By design, the quality of the grain sample is exogenously determined and
held constant across the mystery-seller and the choice experiment observa-
tions. As a result, β3 identifies the wedge between traders WTP for quality
and the price that they offer to farmers. Under competitive market condi-
tions, we would expect the coefficient to be close to zero. A negative sign
would indicate that traders are able to engage in strategic behavior while
transacting with farmers by possibly underreporting quality and quoting a
lower price.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Quality premium offered to farmers
Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics and the distribution of prices offered
by traders to the farmers in the experiment respectively. On average, farmers
are offered a price of 1656 INR per quintal for high-quality wheat as com-
pared to 1590 for the low-quality sample. On average, prices of maize are
lower, but the price premium for the higher quality sample remains. We use
data from these price offers to estimate the quality premia using equation 3.1.
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The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3.5. The dependent vari-
able we use in these estimates is the log of the price offered. Columns (1)
and (2) present the estimates for wheat samples, Columns (3) and (4) for
maize, and finally columns (5) and (6) show the estimates from pooling all
both together. For each set of results, we present estimates with and without
the farmer-trader pair fixed effects.
The results in Table 3.5 indicate that the price differential for higher qual-
ity is positive and statistically significant. The standard errors presented in
the table are clustered by farmer-trader pairs. We also estimate these re-
gressions using village and trader level clustering. In each case the standard
errors are narrower than the ones we present. We take a conservative ap-
proach and use clustering which results in the largest standard errors. The
premium for higher quality wheat and maize is slightly more than 4 percent.
The inclusion of farmer-trader pair fixed effects does not change the effect
size but only result in slightly larger standard errors. This is a result of
the experimental design wherein the quality variable is predetermined and
exogenous in this estimation framework.
When the data for the maize and wheat samples are pooled together the
overall price premium for high-quality that we obtain is about 4.1 percent
higher than the price for the low-quality sample. In monetary terms, this
translates to an increase of nearly INR 59.3 (0.9 USD) per quintal of grain
sold by the farmer, for an increase from low to high quality.
3.5.2 Impact of farmer-trader relationship variables on
quality premia
Given the evidence suggesting the availability of returns to improved quality
for farmers, we then examine the farmer-trader relationship variables that
play a potential role in mediating these premia. The key aspects of the
farmer-trader relationship that we look at are the past transaction history
between the pair (whether a farmer has sold to a trader in the past year),
interactions about market prices (whether a farmer speaks to a trader about
price information, but has not sold to them), and any social interaction (if
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the farmer and trader have exchanged gifts or had any other interaction dur-
ing social occasions). We also include an interaction of high-quality sample
indicator with the number of traders operating in the village in order to
measure the effect of market competition on the quality premium received
by farmers. We estimate these effects using Equation 3.2 and the results are
presented in Table 3.6. The estimates are presented for wheat, maize and
the pooled set of observations in Columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively.
We find that having transacted with a trader in the past year is a strong
predictor of the price premium that a farmer receives for higher quality.
Farmers receive an additional premium, on average, of about 2.2 percent in
the case of wheat and about 1.3 percent for maize from traders to whom they
have sold in the past relative to traders to whom they do not usually sell.
These results suggests that traders may be offering a higher quality premium
as an incentive to retain farmers who are existing customers. This finding is
consistent with past studies that document the stickiness in famers’ choice of
trader (Mitra et al., 2018; Tack and Aker, 2014; Songsermsawas et al., 2015).
On the other hand, traders to whom a farmer speaks to about prices but has
not sold to in the past year offer a slightly lower premium for quality (about
1.1 percent and 1.0 percent lower for wheat and maize respectively). This
could be due to past interactions serving as a signal to the trader about a
farmer’s unwillingness to sell their grain to the trader. However, interactions
during social occasions do not appear to have a strong association with the
price premium for quality.
Finally, an increase in market competition results in a reduction of about
0.8 percent in the price premium offered for quality in the case of wheat.
The effect is statistically not significant in the case of maize sample and the
pooled set of observations. Several reasons may contribute to the somewhat
surprising effect of market competition on price premia seen here. Market
competition prevalent in the sample villages is low, with three being the max-
imum number of traders in a village. With such a small number of traders
operating, it is possible that they coordinate to offer a fixed set of prices to
the farmers in a village. Furthermore, farmers may be unwilling to switch
traders, particularly if they believe that their past relationship with a trader
results in a better price. These results are also consistent with previous
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research the examined the effect of providing price information to potato
farmers in India (Mitra et al., 2018). The authors find that information on
prices fails to reduce middleman margins or enhance farmer welfare owing to
the considerable market power enjoyed by traders.
3.5.3 Information rents for traders
While the above results portray the quality premium that farmers receive for
improved grain characteristics, how much of the quality pay-off is transferred
to farmers, and what share is appropriated by the traders? We answer this
question by combining the farmer price offers from the mystery-seller experi-
ment with traders’ WTP from the choice experiment. Table 3.7 presents the
regression results using Equation 3.3 to estimate the difference in the price
premia offered by traders to farmers and their WTP for grain samples of
identical quality. We present results for each grain separately and with pool-
ing both together, with and without village fixed effects. All specifications
include trader fixed effects.
The coefficient on the indicator for farmer price offer (β1 in Equation 3.3),
the coefficient shown by sample taken by farmer=1) is negative, but not sta-
tistically significant across all samples and specifications. This indicates that
the prices that traders offer to farmers for the low-quality samples do not
differ from their own WTP. The coefficient on “High quality = 1” is signifi-
cant and positive. This indicates that the traders offer a price premium for
quality of about five percent for both wheat and maize samples on average,
across both the mystery-seller experiment and the choice experiment.
However, we find a negative effect on the coefficient on the interaction of
the dummy for farmer price offer and high-quality (β3 in Equation 3.3). The
negative sign implies that the difference in the traders’ valuation for high
quality relative to low quality is larger than the difference in the prices of-
fered by them to farmers for the same change in quality. In other words,
this reflects the difference in the quality premium as valued by the traders
relative to the premium that passes through to farmers. The fact that we
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detect no difference in the low-quality sample between price offered to farm-
ers and the traders’ WTP suggests that quality premia differential arises due
to a reduction in the traders price offers for high quality grain to farmers
vis-a-vis their WTP for the same.
The negative sign on β3 is statistically significant in the case of maize, in-
dicating that traders likely extract rents for quality when purchasing maize
from farmers. On average, the price premium for quality offered by traders
to farmers for maize is about one percent lower than their WTP for iden-
tical maize samples in the choice experiment. The coefficient is negative,
but not significant in the case of wheat suggesting that traders offer a price
premium close to their WTP to farmers for wheat. This difference in the
maize and wheat markets is possibly due to wheat mar-kets being subjected
to the presence of government interventions such as minimum support prices
(MSP) and procurement by public agencies. MSP announcements for rice
and wheat are widely publicized through the media and by extension agen-
cies. Most farmers are aware of the MSP, and this could limit the amount
by which traders cutback on the price premium for wheat. On the other
hand, the government does not actively intervene in the maize markets. As
a result, traders may have greater freedom to extract rents in the form of
lower quality premia for maize sales by farmers.
Finally, we examine if the rents secured by traders vary based on their rela-
tionship with the farmer. In Table 3.8 we present the results of re-estimating
Equation (3), but by limiting the mystery-seller sample to only those obser-
vations in which the farmer had sold grain to the trader in the past year. We
find that the differences in the traders WTP and price premium offered to
farmers for high quality are not statistically significant. This similarity be-
tween the traders valuation and the price that they offer to farmers appears to
be consistent with the earlier results in Table 3.6 where farmers who have sold
to a trader in the past receive a higher quality premium in the mystery-seller
experiment. However, we find that the price offered by traders to farmers
for the low-quality samples in the mystery-seller experiment is smaller than
their WTP in the case of wheat by about 1.7 percent. Taken together these
results suggest that traders incentivize farmers who regularly sell to them for
high quality but also penalize them for lower quality.
69
3.6 Conclusions
This study uses a novel experimental design to evaluate the impact of im-
proved quality on the prices received by farmers for wheat and maize in
India. The main experimental design is based on the mystery shopper ap-
proach used to measure the quality of service delivery in retail and health
studies. We recruit a sample of 98 farmers across 50 villages to approach the
grain traders in their villages posing as potential sellers. The farmers are pro-
vided pretested samples of maize and wheat, and they elicit the prices that
a trader is willing to pay for a fixed quantity of grain shown in each sam-
ple. The results from the mystery-seller experiment indicate that an increase
in quality results in an increase in the price offered to a farmer by about
four percent on average. The results remain robust even after controlling
for farmer-trader pair fixed effects. Our results indicate that farmers receive
a 4 percent premium in the price for improved grain quality. In the study
setting, the additional revenue that a farmer can earn through this quality
premium (based on the average yield and mean the price offered by traders)
would be equivalent to increasing the physical grain yield by about 5 percent
per unit of land – i.e., growing an additional 100 kilograms per hectare.
We then examine whether farmer-trader relationship variables and mea-
sures of market competitiveness are associated with the premium for quality.
We find that having a past sales transaction history with a trader is strongly
associated with better quality premiums. These results suggests that traders
may be offering a higher quality premium as an incentive to retain farmers
who are existing customers, and help explain why farmers tend not to switch
traders. Finally, we compare the price premiums offered by traders to farm-
ers in the experiment with the traders own WTP for identical grain quality
sample elicited through a choice-experiment. We find that traders valuation
of high-quality maize is about 20 percent higher than the price that they
offer to the farmers, suggesting that traders can extract rents for grain qual-
ity in the case of maize. Similar differences are not found in the case of wheat.
Overall, this study provides evidence that farmers can benefit from im-
proving the quality characteristics of the grain that they produce even within
markets that may be imperfect. It adds to the limited literature that exists
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on quantifying the value of quality in agricultural markets, particularly for
staples such as wheat, maize and other grains. Our results suggest that
policies that can foster adoption of grain management, storage and other
postharvest practices that can preserve and improve grain quality can pro-
vide economically significant market returns to smallholder farmers in the
form of returns to quality.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1. Characteristics of villages in the sample
No. of obs Mean Std. dev.
Total number of households 50 367.50 206.76
Number of markets 50 5.50 2.06
Number of markets within 20km 50 4.60 2.07
Number of markets within 10km 50 3.60 2.00
Number of permanent markets within 10 km 50 1.50 1.02
Number of weekly markets within 10 km 50 1.46 1.70
Share of HHs selling wheat to traders 50 0.62 0.29
Share of HHs selling maize to traders 48 0.68 0.25
Share of HHs selling wheat in local market 50 0.07 0.12
Share of HHs selling maize in local market 50 0.11 0.16
Number of grain traders 50 2.28 0.83
Note: Statistics based on baseline village survey data compiled through in-
terviews with village officials, community leaders and groups of farmers, and
official records.
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Table 3.2. Farmer and trader descriptive statistics
Panel A: Characteristics of farmers in the sample
Mean Std. Dev
Age 50.42 13.59
Education (years) 8.51 4.74
Household size 5.08 2.89
Operational holdings (number) 3.76 3.12
Operational holdings area (ha) 0.56 0.55
Wheat area (ha) 1.07 4.61
Wheat production (quintals) 9.09 6.61
Average wheat yield (kg/ha) 2365.11 782.56
Maize area (ha) 0.20 0.21
Maize production (quintals) 7.26 6.97
Average maize yield (kg/ha) 3663.42 756.15
Number of traders sold to 1.05 0.22
No. of wheat sales in past year 2.06 2.04
Quantity of wheat sold in past year (quin-tals) 6.35 14.49
No. of maize sales in past year 1.65 2.14
Quantity of maize sold in past year (quin-tals) 4.75 4.50
Observations 98
Panel B: Characteristics of traders in sample
Mean Std. Dev
Age 44.62 10.03
Education (years) 9.34 2.49
Years working as a trader 15.05 7.94
Trader also farms (1 = Yes) 0.77 0.43
Sells to households (1 = Yes) 0.11 0.32
Sells to other traders (1 = Yes) 0.83 0.38
Sells to millers (1 = Yes) 0.22 0.42
Sells to feed manufacturers (1 = Yes) 0.18 0.38
Wheat Herfindahl-Hirshcman Indexa 0.44 0.21
Maize Herfindahl-Hirshcman Indexa 0.46 0.25
Observations 98
Notes: Statistics based on survey data. a Herfindahl indices are based on the trade volumes
within each village as reported by traders in the survey.
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Table 3.3. Characteristics of farmer-trader pairs
Count Col %
Sold to trader in the past year?
Yes 103 51.0
No 99 49.0
Received gifts from trader on social occasions?
Yes 85 42.1
No 117 57.9
Gave gifts to trader on social occasions?
Yes 84 41.6
No 118 58.4
Any other social interactions?
Yes 5 2.5
No 197 97.5
Do you talk to trader about market prices?
Yes 95 47.0
No 107 53.0
Traders pays for grain within:
Immediately 26 12.9
Within 2 weeks 99 49
2 - 4 weeks 2 1.0
> 4 weeks 1 0.5
Do not know 74 36.6
Does trader pay for transport?
Yes 10 5.0
No 134 66.3
Do not know 58 28.7
Does trader offer credit?
Yes 9 4.5
No 154 76.2
Do not know 39 19.3
Does trader also sell agricultural inputs?
Yes 4 2.0
No 167 82.7
Do not know 31 15.3
Notes: Statistics based on farmer responses in survey regarding each trader that they
interact with in the mystery-seller experiment
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Table 3.4. Prices offered to farmers in the mystery-seller experiment
(INR/quintal)
Mean Std. Dev
Low-quality wheat sample 1590.35 69.29
High-quality wheat sample 1656.31 77.05
Price premium for quality - wheat 65.97 43.30
Low-quality maize sample 1375.97 79.67
High-quality maize sample 1432.15 83.44
Price premium for quality - maize 56.18 34.59
Observations 202
Notes: Statistics based on the prices offered to farmers by each trader for the samples
shown in the mystery-seller experiment
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Table 3.6. Determinants of quality premia: farmer-trader relationship
variables (Dependent variable is log of price offered to farmer in the
mystery-seller experiment)
Wheat Maize Pooled
(1) (2) (3)
High-quality 0.0318*** 0.0359*** 0.0339***
(0.00233) (0.00296) (0.0109)
High quality=1 × 0.0215*** 0.0130*** 0.0173
Sold in past (0.00406) (0.00449) (0.0169)
High quality=1 × -0.0110*** -0.00960** -0.0103
Talk to about prices (0.00303) (0.00382) (0.0193)
High quality=1 × -0.00172 -0.00255 -0.00214
Have some social interaction (0.00439) (0.00460) (0.0169)
High quality=1 × -0.00790*** -0.00314 -0.00552
no. of traders in village (0.00270) (0.00251) (0.0101)
Constant 7.370*** 7.225*** 7.297***
(0.00119) (0.00121) (0.00454)
Farmer-trader pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 394 394 788
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample
is based on the prices offered by traders to each grain sample shown by the farmers. Each
farmer offered two samples of maize and two of wheat for sale to each trader in their
village. High-quality is the coefficient on indicator taking the value 1 if the sample is of
high-quality. Sold in past is an indicator for farmer having sold grain to the trader in the
past, talk about prices is dummy indicating whether farmer talks to trader about prices,
but does not sell any grain, and Have some social interaction is a variable that takes value
1 if the farmer and trader have exchanged gifts or have had any other form of interaction
during festivals, weddings or other social occasions.
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Table 3.8. Difference in price premium offered to farmers who have sold to
a trader in the past and traders WTP for identical grain quality
(Dependent variable is the log of price. Mystery-seller sample limited to
farmers who have sold to trader in the past)
Wheat Maize Pooled
(1) (2) (3)
Sample taken by farmer=1 -0.0166* -0.0196 -0.0181**
(0.00865) (0.0144) (0.00871)
High quality=1 0.0497*** 0.0504*** 0.0501***
(0.00630) (0.00442) (0.00394)
Sample taken by farmer=1 × 0.00239 -0.00326 -0.000436
High quality=1 (0.00645) (0.00488) (0.00390)
Constant 7.336*** 7.275*** 7.305***
(0.00869) (0.0143) (0.00891)
Trader FE Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 402 402 804
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standards errors clustered by trader. Sample
taken by farmer = 1 if observation cor-responds to price offered to farmer in mystery-
seller experiment; 0 if observation is the traders WTP for the grain sample in the choice
experiment. High quality = 1 if for high-quality grain samples, 0 if low-quality grain
sample.
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CHAPTER 4
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
PROHIBITION LAWS ON HUMAN
CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE
FROM INDIA
I venture to suggest to you that it is a matter of deep humiliation
for the country to find its children educated from drink revenue.
We shall deserve the curse of posterity if we so not wisely decide
to stop the drink evil, even though we may have to sacrifice the
education of our children.
Mahatma Gandhi
Harijan. 21 September 1947
4.1 Introduction
Prohibition policies have been, and continue to be, an important tool to reg-
ulate the consumption of alcohol, narcotic drugs, and other addictive goods.
A prominent unintended consequence of such policies is the impact that reg-
ulating one addictive good has on the consumption of its substitutes. For
instance, increasing the implicit cost of alcohol through regulations such as
prohibition or minimum drinking age has been found to result in substitu-
tion towards marijuana consumption in the US (DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001;
Crost and Guerrero, 2012). However, much less is known about the potential
implication these substitution effects have on how households reallocate their
consumption expenditure: if the addictive substitutes are relatively more ex-
pensive, households may reduce expenditure on other non-addictive goods in
response to prohibition policies. In this study, I examine this hitherto unex-
plored consequence of policies regulating addictive consumption on household
budgetary decisions – in particular, their impact on parental investments in
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their children’s human capital goods and the long-run effects of reductions
in such investments.
I examine this question in the context of alcohol prohibition policies and
educational outcomes in India. This developing country context provides
a particularly relevant setting for this study for two reasons. First, private
household investments during early childhood are a crucial input for later life
outcomes in developing countries where public infrastructure is usually lack-
ing. As a result, policies that induce marginal changes in these household
investments decisions can have large effects on demand for children’s edu-
cation and other human development factors. Second, alcohol prohibition
policies have a long history in India and these policies vary at the state-level
over time across the country. Most recently, the state of Bihar introduced
alcohol prohibition in 2016 1 and the potential implications of prohibition
laws remain a subject of active policy debate and academic research in India
(Chaudhuri et al., 2018; Samanta and Narayan, 2017). I use the variation in
state-level alcohol policies starting in the 1970s to test the relationship be-
tween prohibition laws, addictive consumption and substitution, and house-
hold investments in children’s education. The focus on educational outcomes
is guided by the fact that they are a critical human capital factor, comprising
one of the three dimensions of the Human Development Index. Furthermore,
the level of household investments is known to be a critical factor in driving
the demand for education in developing countries (Glewwe and Jacoby, 2004;
Huisman and Smits, 2009; Adams Jr and Cuecuecha, 2010).
A number of states in India have experimented with alcohol prohibition
policies during the period of analysis used in this study (Table 4.1). These
policies have taken one of two forms: some states imposed a complete bans
which outlawed sale and consumption of all forms of alcohol while others en-
forced partial bans covering only a particular form of cheap alcohol known as
arrack popularly consumed among poorer households (Rahman, 2002). I use
household consumption expenditure survey data from quinquennial rounds
of National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) spanning the period from
1987 to 2011. These repeated cross-sectional data provide detailed expen-
1https://www.hindustantimes.com/editorials/bihar-liquor-ban-such-prohibitions-
rarely-work/story-hBV4aLbcj9kFgo2Ju2M4DO.html
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diture information on a comprehensive list of consumption and investment
goods. Specifically, the NSSO data include spending on different categories
of alcohol, including arrack, as well as other addictive goods such as to-
bacco products. In addition, data are also collected on a households’s annual
spending on education. I employ a differences-in-differences strategy to es-
timate the effect of both complete and partial alcohol bans on household
expenditure decisions. The results indicate that partial bans increase the
share of expenditure spent on non-arrack alcohol by more than 0.26 percent-
age points (nearly 75 percent of the sample mean). They also result in an
increase in the budget share allocated to tobacco products. Finally, I also
find that these substitution effects result in a decrease in spending on edu-
cation. The average household budget share of education decreases by nearly
0.45 percentage points when it is exposed to a partial alcohol ban – a decline
of nearly 18 percent compared to sample mean education budget share of 2.4
percent. Complete bans, on the other hand, do not have a significant effect
on education expenditure.
A potential threat to the validity of these difference-in-difference estimates
is that the enactment of these state-level alcohol prohibition laws are likely
to be correlated with pre-existing alcohol consumption habits and other un-
observed characteristics of the population living in those states. The lack of
consistent data for multiple pre-ban periods makes it difficult to undertake
tests of parallel trends. However, I exploit the presence of religious norms
proscribing alcohol consumption to undertake a novel triple-difference empir-
ical strategy to bolster the initial results. The triple-difference strategy relies
on the assumption that Muslim households are unlikely to be affected by
changes in alcohol policies because Islamic religious laws prohibit consump-
tion of alcohol. I provide empirical evidence to support this assumption by
showing that non-Muslim households exhibit a significant decline in alco-
hol participation when prohibition policies are enacted, while no change is
observed among Muslim families. The results of the triple-difference estima-
tion remain consistent with the double-difference estimates. These estimates
confirm an increase in non-arrack alcohol, total alcohol and tobacco budget
shares as a result of partial bans. I also continue to find a significant reduc-
tion in the expenditure on education in response to partial prohibition laws,
though the magnitude of the decline is slightly lower at about 13 percent of
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the sample mean compared to the 18 percent decline implied by the double-
difference estimates.
The difference in the household responses to complete versus partial bans
is likely to be driven by the variation in the strength of enforcement and the
availability of alternatives to banned alcohol under the two regimes. House-
holds in states with partial prohibition could easily switch to costlier, non-
arrack forms of alcohol consumption. Multiple sources of information also
indicate that the partial prohibition laws were circumvented by households
through consumption of costlier, illegally supplied arrack. For instance news
reports from the state of Kerala during its arrack ban in 1996 indicate that
liquor manufacturers and suppliers were able to bribe enforcement officials
to sell illicit arrack in the state2. It was also widely reported that people
who previously consumed arrack were likely to have switched over to costlier
forms of liquor. Policymakers also widely acknowledged that arrack bans
were difficult to implement 3 4.
Next, I examine the long-run consequences of these declines in parental
investments on the education of their children. I present results on the im-
pact of prohibition policies on educational outcomes as measured by years
of schooling attained by the time an individual reaches adulthood. To do
so, I use data from the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) - Round
3 (2005-06). I construct state-year of birth cohorts using data on individu-
als year of birth and location from the NFHS. I then exploit the temporal
and spatial variation of the state-level alcohol bans and use a difference-
in-differences strategy to estimate the impact of exposure to such bans on
educational outcomes of the exposed cohorts in the sample. Individuals who
were of school-going age (18 or younger) during the prohibition period in
a state are the ones who would experience any effect of the ban. The es-
timation compares the difference in the educational outcomes for exposed
cohorts between treatment and control states relative to the difference for
older cohorts across the two groups of states. Consistent with the impact on
2http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/23keral.htm
3http://www.deccanherald.com/content/468298/government-open-reintroducing-sale-
arrack.html
4http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chief-minister-vijaya-bhaskara-reddy-bans-arrack-
sale-in-andhra-pradesh/1/303222.html
83
households’ education investment decisions, I find that partial bans result in
an average decline of about 0.26 years of schooling amongst exposed cohorts
(an increase of nearly 4 percent relative to the sample mean). I also find an
increase in years of schooling of about 0.2 years due to complete prohibition
laws even though I find no evidence for an increase in expenditure on educa-
tion due to such laws. These results suggest that complete prohibition may
affect educational outcomes through other channels. Previous research in
India has suggested that complete prohibition is associated with reductions
in domestic violence and crime rates, and these mechanisms may explain the
result on school years that I find (Luca et al., 2015; Chaudhuri et al., 2018).
The main assumption underlying this identification strategy is that there are
no unobserved time-varying effects that are correlated with the treatment
(imposition of prohibition policies) and also influence individual education
outcomes. I provide evidence for the validity of this assumption by running
a falsification test: I test the effect of the bans on cohorts who were just out
of school-age (19 - 21) at the time of the policy change compared to older
cohorts (22 - 35). I find no impact on the school years for this cohort which
corroborates the assumption that the policy changes were plausibly exoge-
nous and provides additional validity to the main results.
The results of this study contribute to the literature on the unintended
consequences of policies that seek to regulate addictive consumption. While
existing research has examined these effects of alcohol regulation in the US
and other developed country contexts, there is limited evidence from low-
income settings. Second, this paper also adds to the literature on the impor-
tance of early childhood investments and human capital development. For
instance, early-life adverse income shocks induced by rainfall or crop losses
are found to have negative consequences for educational outcomes in later
years (Jensen, 2000; Cameron and Worswick, 2001). Recent studies on the
impact of unconditional cash transfers also find some evidence that house-
holds increased investments in education and health in response to the cash
transfers (Benhassine et al., 2015; Baird et al., 2011; Akresh et al., 2013).
While most studies examine the effect of changes to family income on de-
mand for education, consumer theory suggests that similar wealth effects can
be induced by shifting household consumption. In particular, the results I
find here suggest that policies that restrict consumption of addictive goods
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such as alcohol could potentially result in a substitution of household ex-
penditure towards human capital goods such as health and education. The
impact of such substitution is likely to be more pronounced in the context
of developing countries where education usually requires private expenditure
by households (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006).
4.2 Background: Alcohol regulation in India
Alcohol consumption has been rapidly increasing since the 1980s in India,
with an estimated increase in the per capita consumption of 106.7 % between
1970 - 72 and 1994 - 96 (Das et al., 2006). Taxes and excise duties on alco-
hol sales are an important, and an increasing source of revenue for the state
governments in India and can comprise up to 15-20 % of their total revenue
(Benegal, 2005). After independence, motivated by the anti-alcohol tenets
of Gandhian thought, the Constitution of India directed that “The State
shall endeavor to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicat-
ing drink.”(Das et al., 2006). Alcohol regulation comes under the legislative
purview of state-level governments in India, and each state can independently
decide upon the control and organization of the alcohol supply and demand.
Alcohol laws prohibiting consumption of liquor to various degrees have of-
ten been the policy instrument used by state governments in post-colonial In-
dia. In the initial, post-independent years many state governments embraced
the constitutional directive to prohibit alcohol production and consumption.
However, by the 1960s most states, with the exception of the state of Gu-
jarat, revoked these bans5. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s there
were renewed demands for clamping down on alcohol consumption. States
varied in their motivation for alcohol regulation. In some cases deaths due to
consumption of illicit alcohol (often referred to as hooch tragedies) spurred
policy makers to enforce bans on arrack 6. In other instances, public advo-
cacy from women’s groups (in Andhra Pradesh and Haryana for instance)
5Gujarat has a prohibition policy in place since the inception of the state in 1960. In
the analysis here I do not include Gujarat as a treatment state since it has experienced
no policy change during the period analyzed.
6Arrack is a form of alcohol distilled locally, and often sold through unlicensed outlets,
particularly in rural areas
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and religious organizations (particularly church groups in the north-eastern
states) motivated political parties to enact complete prohibition as a part of
their electoral promises (Patel, 1998).
The state prohibition acts also vary from partial ban on certain cate-
gories of alcohol to complete prohibition under which all forms of alcohol
are banned. For instance, in certain states, the alcohol ban was limited to
arrack which is largely consumed in rural areas. Table 4.1 provides a timeline
of both types of bans. The states that imposed these bans are also spread
geographically across the country (see Figure 4.1).
Complete prohibition laws made production, transportation, sale and con-
sumption of liquor illegal. Substantial penalties were imposed including
heavy fines and imprisonment for up to three years 7. News sources report
numerous incidents in which offenders were arrested and penalized. However,
there are also many anecdotal reports that indicate that the enforcement of
these bans was far from stringent. For instance, the executive director of a
prominent distiller was reported saying: “Liquor from five states bordering
Andhra Pradesh – Maharashtra, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and
Tamil Nadu – continues to flow into it” while complete prohibition was in
place (Outlook, 1996).
As Table 4.1 shows most of the states that imposed complete bans rolled
back the policies after a few years. Alcohol prohibition usually resulted in a
significant negative impact on state’s revenues. This revenue decline along
with the rising cost of enforcement forced states to repeal these acts (Mahal,
2000). In comparison, partial bans that target arrack consumption have had
greater longevity, even though enforcement has been an issue with these as
well. While alcohol prohibition remains an important policy debate in India,
there has been very limited work on examining the economic effects and so-
cial impacts of such policies. The lack of systematic data on production, sale,
and consumption of alcohol at a disaggregated level in the Indian context has
limited the scope of analysis.
7See the following media report from Haryana for instance:
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/18/world/indian-state-s-alcohol-ban-pleases-women-
annoys-men.html.
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There have been only two studies that explicitly examine the effects of
prohibition policies. Both of these use self-reported alcohol expenditure data
from the national consumption surveys. Mahal (2000) looked at the relative
efficacy of various regulatory measures in reducing alcohol consumption us-
ing cross-sectional data from rural India. He finds suggestive evidence that
taxation works as a better policy for regulating alcohol consumption. Rah-
man (2002) examines the impact of alcohol prohibition on the consumption
of other addictive substances and finds that prohibition leads to an increase
in consumption of some tobacco products. Both of these studies do find that
the alcohol prohibition laws, on average, did have a significant negative im-
pact on alcohol consumption. Based on data from consumption expenditure
surveys the estimated decline ranges from 22 % (Rahman, 2002) to a decline
of 30 % to 67 % in the case of Mahal (2000). However, interestingly both
studies find that alcohol consumption did not go down to zero even in states
that experienced a complete ban, lending further evidence to the anecdotal
reports that indicated weak enforcement of the alcohol regulation.
The reduction in alcohol consumption could translate to positive in utero
and early life shocks by reducing direct exposure to alcohol as well as indi-
rectly, through income and substitution effects. Epidemiological studies pro-
vide strong evidence of the negative effects of direct fetal exposure to alcohol.
Alcohol consumption by pregnant mothers is associated with a range of fetal
alcohol spectrum disorders detrimental to birth outcomes and child develop-
ment8. Studies also point to the adverse effects of neonatal and postnatal
alcohol consumption by mothers on child development (Little et al., 2002,
1989). In the Indian context, this channel is likely to be less pronounced due
to the relatively lower prevalence of alcohol consumption among women in
India – some studies estimate the prevalence of alcohol use among women to
be around 5 % (Benegal et al., 2005).
The second mechanism, which is likely to be stronger in the Indian context,
is through foregone household income and substitution between spending on
alcohol and expenditures on health and education. Higher spending on alco-
8http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/alcohol-use.html
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hol consumption could lead to non-use or delayed maternal and child health-
care, school dropouts, and other negative consequences. For instance, Bonu
et al. (2004), based on a multivariate analysis of nationally representative
household data from India, found that households using tobacco or alcohol
were less likely to immunize their children and exhibited reduced ability to
provide adequate childcare, resulting in adverse health outcomes for children.
Given the weak enforcement and imperfect compliance, the net effect of the
alcohol bans on human capital outcomes is a priori ambiguous. The effect
of alcohol prohibition on a household’s resource re-allocation depends upon
consumption preferences, availability and access to addictive substitutes, as
well as the effectiveness of the bans. If the bans were perfect, then a house-
hold would redistribute the entire share of expenditure previously spent on
alcohol on other goods. However under an imperfect ban, the effect of the
prohibition policy is to increase the implicit price of alcohol and the result-
ing effect on consumption of addictive goods is not straightforward to predict
(Becker et al., 1991). In this study, I emprically examine the impact of pro-
hibition policies in India on household consumption behavior, and in turn
the consequences of these changes on long-run educational outcomes.
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 Household consumption behavior
To examine the effect of prohibtion policies on consumption data I use de-
tailed household consumption expenditures data from the quinquennial sur-
veys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). These
NSSO surveys collect data on various items of household consumption, in-
cluding various types of alcohol and educational goods such as books, sta-
tionery, tuition fees and other related items (NSSO). The survey also collects
data on household demographic characteristics such as age, education and
other details of household members, religion and caste, and includes infor-
mation on the state, whether the household is located in urban or rural area
and other variables. Using data on the household expenditure on individual
items, I compute the total consumption expenditure and the budget shares of
various items of interest to be used in the analysis. The NSSO data that I use
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spans the period 1987 to 2011 and various survey rounds provide repeated
cross-sections at roughly 5 year intervals 9. The overall sample consists of
nearly 700,000 households across all the survey rounds.
I estimate the effect of the alcohol bans on household budget shares using
a difference-in-difference regression of the following form:
yist = β0 + β1D
c
s,t + β2D
p
s,t + Xi,s,tθ + αt + γs + δs,t + εist (4.1)
where yist is budget share for good y (either alcohol, tobacco or educa-
tional goods) household i in state s during year t. αt are year (survey round)
fixed effects; γs is state dummies; δs,t are state-specific time trends. D
c
s,t is an
indicator taking the value 1 if the state had a complete ban during year t and
Dps,t is a similar treatment indicator for a partial alcohol ban. Xist is a set of
household controls which include age, sex, education level and marital status
of household head, number of male and female children under 18, household
size, monthly per capita consumption quintile, religion, and scheduled caste
or tribe indicators.
The use of a standard difference-in-difference estimator can be problem-
atic, given the time period that these data cover. The surveys do not provide
sufficient pre-treatment data points for many of the states that experienced
alcohol prohibition policies. However, a more robust, triple-difference estima-
tion strategy is possible, using the fact that Muslim households are unlikely
to be affected by changes in alcohol policy. Religious rules in Islam pro-
hibit alcohol consumption (Michalak and Trocki, 2006). Table 4.2 presents
preliminary evidence showing that the share of Muslim households that re-
port consumption of alcohol is much lower than other religious groups in the
NSSO data. Importantly, there is no signficant difference in the reported al-
cohol use in Muslim households across alcohol policy regimes. On the other
hand, significant differences are observed across all other religious groups
(Table 4.2). This suggests a potential triple-difference identification strategy
using Muslim households as a placebo group. To provide support for this
triple-difference estimation, I first estimate Equation 4.1 separately for non-
9The NSSO rounds that I use are the following: Round 43 (1987), Round 50 (1993),
Round 55 (1999), Round 61 (2004), Round 66 (2009) and Round 68 (2011)
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Muslim and Musim households to show that the alcohol bans do not impact
alcohol expenditure among Muslim households. Following this, I estimate a
triple-difference model of the following form:
yist = β0 + β1Ss + β2Mi + β3(Ss ×Mi) + δ0Tt + δ1(Tt ×Mi) (4.2)
+δc2D
c
s,t + δ
c
3(D
c
s,t ×Mi) + δp2Dps,t + δp3(Dps,t ×Mi)
+ Xi,s,tθ + δs,t + εist
where Ss is a set of state dummies, M is an indicator taking the value 1 if
household i is non-Muslim, Tt is a set of survey year dummies, and other vari-
ables remain the same as in the above equation The coefficients of interest are
δ3 which measure the relative change in the outcome for non-Muslim house-
holds in treatment states, netting out the changes in non-Muslim households
in control states and the change in Muslim households in the treatment states.
4.3.2 Long-run education outcomes
I use data from the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS). NFHS is a
nationally representative survey that provides a broad range of demographic,
health, gender and nutritional information (IIPS, 2007). I use the household
members data set from NFHS-3 for examining the impact on education. The
survey collects information on the level of educational attainment in terms
of the highest grade completed. NFHS provides a constructed variable which
converts this grade completed to the corresponding number of years of edu-
cation based on usual grade completion years for India (see IIPS (2007) for
details). This serves as the dependent variable in the Equation 4.3. The
survey also collects data on age (in years), gender, location (urban/rural
and state of residence) and other control variables. Finally, the NFHS also
records the date on which the survey was conducted. Using this information
along with data on the individual’s age I construct a variable for the year of
birth for each observation. I then use this to construct the variable for ex-
posure to the ban if the individual resides in a state that enacted an alcohol
prohibition law.
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To estimate the impact on educational outcomes I exploit the fact that the
exposure to the alcohol ban is determined jointly by the individual’s state of
residence and his/her year of birth. Individuals who were over the age of 18
at the start of the ban are already out of school or close to finishing school
and normally would not derive any benefit in the form of additional years of
school due to the ban. Children who were younger would be exposed to the
ban, and serve as the treatment group. Empirically this intuition translates
to the following estimating equation:
yist = β0+ β1
(
Dcs,t × Ti
)
+ β2
(
Dps,t × Ti
)
+Xi,s,tθ+ αt+ γs+ δs,t+εist (4.3)
where yist is years of education for individual i, born in year t in state s.
αt are year of birth dummies; γs is state dummies; δs,t are state-specific time
trends. These control for age, unobserved time-invariant and linearly trend-
ing state-level factors respectively. Dps,t is an indicator for states with partial
prohibition and Dcs,t is an indicator for states with complete prohibition. Ti
is a dummy that takes value 1 if individual i was of school-going age (at most
18 years of age) during the prohibition period. For instance, in the case of
the state of Andhra Pradesh which had a complete ban from 1995-1997 this
interaction would take the value 1 for those individuals who were between
ages 4-16 by 1995.
Xist is a set of individual controls. The first of these is an indicator for
the gender of the individual. Female children in India are known to receive
less schooling on average compared to male children. Social groups are also
known to play an important role in determining the level of educational at-
tainment among children. Therefore, I control for religion and caste group
to which the individual belongs. Also, educational infrastructure is likely
to vary across urban and rural areas, and hence, I also control for whether
an individual resides in urban or rural area. Finally, the NFHS provides a
wealth index variable for a household based on a listing of assets and ameni-
ties owned (see IIPS (2007) for details of the construction of this variable).
This serves as a proxy for household wealth. I control for wealth index quin-
tile since educational attainment is likely to be a function of the household’s
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wealth.
The underlying assumption for the identification strategy is that the impo-
sition of the ban is exogenous i.e.,
(
Dcs,t × Ti
)
and
(
Dps,t × Ti
)
are uncorrelated
with εist in Equation 4.3. The fact that the sample includes older cohorts
whose years of schooling cannot have been affected by the policy change al-
lows me to test this assumption. To do so I estimate a regression model of
the following form.
yist = β0+
2∑
j=1
βj
(
Dcs,t × Ti,j
)
+
2∑
k=1
βk
(
Dps,t × Ti,j
)
+Xi,s,tθ+ αt+ γs+ δs,t+εist
(4.4)
where Tj s an indicator that takes value 1 if individual i is in the cohort j.
I define two cohorts: the cohort in the school-going age at the primary school
age (6 - 18) during the time when the ban was in place (j = 1) and an older
cohort aged 19 - 21 who were just over the school-going age (j = 2). The
excluded group consists of individuals in the cohort aged 22 and above. The
other variables are defined the same way as in equation 4.3. If the coefficient
on the 19 - 21 age group is not significantly different from zero, this would
lend support for the identification strategy.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Impact on household expenditure decisions
Alcohol consumption
I first examine the impact of complete and partial bans on the share of
household expenditure allocated to alcohol goods using Equation 4.1. The
NSSO surveys collect data on the quantity and value of different types of al-
cohol consumed by the household in the past 30 days from all sources (home
produces, market purchases and in-kind transfers). The types of alcohol
include arrack (also known as country liquor) – the form of alcohol banned
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under partial prohibtion laws – beer, toddy and “Indian made foreign liquor”
(IMFL). I use this information to calculate the consumption value of these
items as a share of total household expenditure. I estimate the effect on the
budget shares of these alcohol products and present the results in Table 4.3.
Panel A presents the results of the regression for the full sample of households
while Panels B and C present the estimates for rural and urban households
separately. I estimate the impact on expenditure shares for arrack consump-
tion share in Column (1), the sum of non-arrack alcohol consumption share
in Column (2) and the total share of all alcohol consumption in Column (3).
In the full sample, complete alcohol bans result in a reduction in the budget
share of arrack and total alcohol consumption by 0.31 and 0.37 percentage
points respectively. On the other hand, partial bans reduce arrack expen-
diture share but result in an increase in the share of household expenditure
on other forms of alcohol by more than 0.26 percentage points (Panel A).
We see similar results for the sample of rural households in Panel B and
urban households in Panel C. Complete bans result in a decline in alcohol
spending, while partial bans show heightened non-arrack expenditure. These
results suggest that under partial bans households are more likely to substi-
tute towards other forms of alcohol which tend to be more expensive than
arrack. As a result, the total expenditure on all alcohol is likely to increase.
The point estimate on the coefficient on partial bans in the regression on to-
tal alcohol budget share outcome is positive (0.03 percentage points), though
imprecise with a wide standard error (Panel A, Column (3)).
However, these difference-in-difference estimates could be biased due to
enactment of state-level alcohol prohibition laws being correlated with pre-
existing alcohol consumption habits in those states. To overcome this issue,
I estimate the triple-difference regression in Equation 4.3. Prior to the triple
- difference results, I first present empirical support for this estimation strat-
egy in Table 4.4 by estimating the difference-in-difference model separately
for non-Muslim (Panel A) and Muslim households (Panel B). The results in
Panel A, for non-Muslim households, remain consistent with the full sample
results in Table 4.3. Crucially, in Panel B, we find no effect of the pol-
icy changes on alcohol expenditure within Muslim households. This provides
empirical support for the observation that religious norms are likely to have a
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stronger influence on alcohol consumption among Muslim households rather
than prohibition policies. As a result, they form a potential placebo group
that can be included in a triple-difference estimation strategy. I present the
triple - difference results in Table 4.5. For brevity, the tables show only the
coefficients on the interaction of alcohol ban treatment dummies with the
indicator for non-Muslim households δc3 and δ
p
3 respectively, for complete and
partial bans. The layout of the results is similar to the previous table.
The impact of the complete bans on reducing alcohol expenditures in the
triple-difference estimates is much less pronounced when compared to the
earlier difference-in-difference estimates. While the point estimates remain
negative, the reduction is statistically significant only for non-arrack alcohol
consumption in urban areas. On the other hand, the results of the impact of
partial bans remain robust, particularly for the sample of rural households
(Panel B). The triple-difference estimates suggest that not only do rural
households see a shift towards non-arrack consumption when faced with par-
tial bans, but also that this substitution results in a net increase in overall
alcohol expenditure shares by more than 0.15 percentage points (about 16
percent of the average alcohol budget share in the rural sample).
Tobacco consumption
Previous research in the US suggests that tobacco consumption is comple-
mentary with alcohol, (Decker and Schwartz, 2000). Limited evidence within
India also indicates complementarity of alcohol and tobacco consumption
(John, 2005). To account for such behavioral patterns of addictive consump-
tion, I examine the implications of prohibition policies on tobacco expen-
diture as well. I estimate the impact of complete and partial bans using
Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.3 with budget share of tobacco products as the
outcome variable. The results are presented in Table 4.6, with Panel A show-
ing the difference-in-difference in results and the triple-difference results in
Panel B. Both sets of estimates show that partial bans result in an increase in
the household spending on tobacco. The results are particularly consistent
for the effect of the partial ban in the full sample and in the rural areas,
with both estimates suggesting a statistically significant increase in tobacco
budget share. The magnitude of the effect is much larger in the difference-in-
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difference estimates compared to the triple-difference results. For the rural
sample, the triple-difference estimates (Panel B, Column 2) imply an in-
crease of 0.28 percentage points in the tobacco budget share (an increase of
more than 23 percent relative to the sample mean). Taking into account the
increase in alcohol budget share seen in the triple-difference results for the
rural sample, this increase in tobacco consumption appears consistent with
the notion that the two goods are complements. The coefficient on the com-
plete ban is more sensitive across the specifications and ranges from no-effect
to a positive impact of 0.49 percentage points for the rural sample in the
triple-difference results.
Educational investments
The previous sets of results document the evidence for the unintended
increase in consumption expenditure on addictive goods as a result of the
partial prohibition policies amongst rural households – both in terms of the
net increase in the budget share of alcohol good as well as the higher share for
tobacco products. Next, I examine whether these household budgetary real-
locations also imply reductions in parental investments on childrens’ human
capital goods. The NSSO survey provides data on household spending on
education – a critical portion of early childhood investments. Similar expen-
diture data on health, nutrition or other human capital inputs for children is
unavailable. Therefore, I focus on education in this analysis.
I present these results in Table 4.7. Similar to the previous results, Panel A
of the table shows the estimates from the difference-in-difference regressions
while Panel B portrays the triple-difference results. The estimates for the
impact of exposure to partial bans on the share of household expenditure on
education remain robust across both the specifications, and across the sam-
ples as well. The results strongly suggest that there is a decline in parental
investments on childrens’ education as a result of partial alcohol prohibition
laws. The triple-difference estimates indicate that the budget share declines
by more 0.3 percentage points for the full sample - a reduction of more than
13 percent relative to the average household spending on education. The
magnitude of this decline is much more pronounced in rural areas at around
0.44 percentage points or nearly 25 percent of the rural average.
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Taken together the results on the household expenditure decisions suggest
that partial bans prompt substition towards more expensive alcohol prod-
ucts that do not fall under the partial prohibition laws. They also see an
associated increase in tobacco spending. Finally, the estimates suggest that
these increases in the budget share of addictive consumption goods lead to a
reduction in the parental investments in children’s human capital - at least
as measured in terms of educational expenditures.
4.4.2 Impact on long-run educational outcomes
Given the evidence suggesting a decline in spending on education, I exam-
ine whether these reductions result in significant negative effects on long-run
educational outcomes. I focus on the total years of schooling as a measure
of educational outcome using data from NFHS-3. I limit the observations to
those individuals who are age 18 or above by the survey date. This ensures
that all individuals in the sample have reached the usual school completion
age, and are fully exposed to the risk of drop-out. I also limit observations to
those individuals who were born after 1960. I do this for two reasons. First,
individuals older than this age are likely to have been exposed to the early
waves of alcohol prohibition laws in the 1950s and 1960s. Precise informa-
tion on the location and timing of these early bans is unavailable since state
borders in India underwent much reorganization during this period. Second,
reports on years of schooling among older cohorts is more likely to suffer from
recall bias 10. The final sample consists of nearly 230,000 observations of in-
dividuals who were in the age group 18 - 45 at the time of the NFHS-3 survey.
A potential source of error could arise if individuals have migrated from
the state in which they resided during their school-going age to their current
state of residence at the time of the survey. This would imply that they are
mistakenly identified as being exposed to an alcohol ban but in reality were
not (or vice versa). There are two reasons why this may not pose an issue
for the analysis in this paper. First, inter-state migration is estimated to be
very small, particularly during the time period in which this analysis takes
10The results remain robust to changes in the birth year of the oldest cohort.
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place. Topalova (2007), using national survey data estimated that less than
4 percent of people living in rural areas reported changing either district of
residence within the past ten years during the 1980s in India. Second, such
migration is unlikely to be systematically correlated to the imposition of al-
cohol regulation by state governments.
I estimate Equation 4.3 with and without individual control variables, and
across rural and urban samples separately. These results are presented in
Table 4.8. Column (1) presents the estimation results for the specification
that does not include individual controls. In Column (2) I present the results
for the specification that includes individual-level control variables. Finally,
Column (3) and (4) present corresponding results for the urban and rural
sub-samples respectively. The main variables of interest are the treatment
indicators Complete ban × age 6 18 and Partial ban × age 6 - 18. These
indicate the difference in years of schooling for young cohorts (aged 6 to 18)
relative to older cohorts (greater than 18 years of age) in treatment states in
comparison to the same difference in states that did not have a ban.
The coefficient on exposure to partial bans is significant and has a negative
sign throughout all the specifications. The magnitude of the negative effect
is -0.302 years in the specification without controls and reduces to -0.263
with the inclusion of control variables in Column (2).This coefficient size
translates to slightly more than four percent of the sample mean in Column
(2). When split across urban and rural samples we find that the effect of the
partial ban is much higher in rural areas. On average, exposure to partial
bans results in a reduction of -0.348 years of education (about 6.6 percent of
the sample mean) in the rural sample (Column (4)). The effect of the partial
bans is lower amongst individuals residing in urban areas (Column (3)), at
about 2.6 percent of the sample mean (-0.204 years).
Exposure to complete prohibition results in a positive impact on the years
of schooling in the overall sample. The coefficient is not statistically signifi-
cant in the specification without individual control variables in Column (1)
but is significant at the 10 percent level when controls are included in Column
(2). The effect size is about 3.1 percent of the sample mean. When urban
and rural samples are examined separately we find that the effect largely
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appears to be driven by the positive impact in rural areas (a coefficient of
0.287 in Column (4)). The coefficient remains positive, but not statistically
significant in the urban sample in Column (3).
The next set of results examine the impact of alcohol regulation on likeli-
hood of dropping out from school. These results provide suggestive evidence
for the mechanism that underlies the impact on years of schooling. The esti-
mating equation is similar to Equation 4.3. The dependent variable is defined
as taking the value 1 if an individual dropped out from school. School drop-
out is defined as having less than 12 years of school, given that individual is
more than 18 years of age and has enrolled in school at some time. Using
this binary variable as the dependent variable, I estimate a linear probability
model for the likelihood of drop-out.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 4.9. Given that the de-
pendent variable takes the value 1 if an individual dropped out from school,
a positive coefficient indicates an increased probability for drop-out. In the
full sample, Column (1), the results show that partial bans increase the likeli-
hood of drop-out by 2 percentage points, while complete bans have no effect.
However, in the rural sample, the complete bans have a significant effect on
reducing probability of drop-out by 5.1 percentage points. Overall the di-
rection of the effects on probability of drop-out follow a pattern analogous
to the results seen in the case of years of schooling. This suggests that the
alcohol bans have an impact on educational outcomes by operating through
their effect on drop-out.
Finally, I undertake a falsification test to show that the years of schooling
remains unchanged for individuals in treatment states who were just above
the school-going age by the time when the prohibition policies were enacted.
To do so I estimate the regression model presented in Equation 4.4. The
results of this estimation are presented in Table 4.10. For brevity, I present
only the coefficients of interest. I present the estimates without controls,
with the inclusion of control variables, and split across the urban and rural
samples from Columns (1) - (4) respectively. The coefficients measuring the
impact of the policy on individuals of school-going age 6-18 remain quali-
tatively similar to the estimates in Table 4.8. The key result here is that
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the policies have no effect on cohorts age 19-21 in comparison to the control
cohorts (aged 22 and above) across all three samples (complete, urban and
rural) as well as for both types of bans which helps corroborate the identifi-
cation assumption used in the analysis.
Overall, these results on the long-run educational outcomes are consistent
with the observed changes in household expenditure decisions in response to
alcohol prohibition laws – particularly with respect to partial bans. Consis-
tent with the impact on households’ education investment decisions, I find
that partial bans result in a decline in the years of schooling amongst exposed
cohorts. The results also suggest an increase in years of schooling in cohorts
exposed to complete prohibition laws even though I find no evidence for an
increase in expenditure on education due to such laws. A likely explanation
for this finding could be that complete prohibition may affect educational
outcomes through other channels. Previous research in India has suggested
that complete prohibition is associated with reductions in domestic violence
and crime rates, and these mechanisms may explain the result on school years
that I find (Luca et al., 2015; Chaudhuri et al., 2018).
4.5 Conclusions
This paper examines a previously unexplored consequence of policies that
seek to regulate consumption of addictive goods – their impact on changes in
household consumption behavior towards human capital investments in chil-
dren. These changes are the result of substitution effects in the consumption
of addictive goods wherein raising the implicit cost of one addictive good
through policies such as prohibition leads to an increase in consumption of
other addictive goods.
In the context of this study, the substitution that we observe is in re-
sponse to alcohol prohibition policies in India, particularly, partial bans that
outlaw a particular type of alcohol - arrack. Using detailed survey data on
household consumption expenditure I show that households increase their net
spending on alcohol (by shifting to non-arrack types of alcohol) and tobacco
goods when exposed to partial prohibition. Estimates from a triple-difference
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strategy that exploits the presence of Islamic religious norms that prohibit
alcohol consumption, I find that partial bans result in a net increase in al-
cohol budget share by nearly 16 percent relative to the sample mean and
tobacco by 23 percent in rural households. As a result, we find a reduction
in spending on education, with the magnitude of this decline being around
0.44 percentage points or nearly 25 percent of the rural average in rural areas.
The second set of results I present in this study show that these reduction
in household investments have long-term consequences. Consistent with the
impact on households’ education investment decisions, I find that partial bans
result in an average decline of about 0.26 years of schooling amongst exposed
cohorts (an increase of nearly 4 percent relative to the sample mean). I also
find an increase in years of schooling of about 0.2 years due to complete
prohibition laws, albeit, potentially through channels other than the house-
hold expenditure behavior. However, I do not find strong evidence for an
increase in educational investments due to complete prohibition, suggesting
that other mechanisms such as changes in intrahousehold bargaining power,
reduced crime rates or other channels may play a role.
The evidence presented here provides a mixed picture of the impact of
alcohol regulation policies on educational outcomes in India. Computing the
true economic cost of such policies requires estimating the returns to these
additional years in school and the economic costs and benefits due to other
potential impacts of prohibition. The findings in this study underscore the
need for considering the potential unintended, long-run costs in designing
policies for regulating alcohol, marijuana and other addictive goods.
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4.6 Figure and Tables
Figure 4.1: Location of states enacting alcohol prohibition laws in India
(1974-1997)
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Table 4.1. Timeline of alcohol prohibition laws in India (1974 to 1997)
State Start of ban End of ban
Complete Prohibition
Nagaland 1989 Present
Manipur 1991 Present
Andhra Pradesh 1995 1997
Haryana 1996 1998
Mizoram 1997 2014
Tamil Nadu 1974 1981
Orissa 1994 1995
Gujarat 1960 Present
Partial prohibition
Tamil Nadu 1987 Present
Andhra Pradesh 1993 Present
Kerala 1996 present
Rajasthan 1986 1989
Uttar Pradesh 1993 1998
Notes: Timeline of bans is assembled from various media report and based on information
drawn from (Rahman, 2002; Mahal, 2000)
Table 4.2. Prevalence of alcohol consumption across religious groups - with
and without alcohol bans
= 1 if HH consumes alcohol
No ban Ban Difference
Religion
Hinduism 0.151 0.129 0.021∗∗∗
Islam 0.033 0.036 -0.003
Christianity 0.256 0.125 0.131∗∗∗
Sikhism 0.205 0.086 0.119∗∗
Others 0.487 0.184 0.302∗∗∗
Total 0.147 0.119 0.028∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if
household reports any consumption of alcohol. Data is based on NSSO surveys from 1987
2011.
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Table 4.3. Impact of prohibition policies on alcohol budget share (% of
total household consumption expenditure) of households
Panel A: Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban -0.305∗∗ -0.0631 -0.368∗
(0.119) (0.0990) (0.181)
Partial ban -0.231∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.0315
(0.0597) (0.110) (0.128)
Mean of dependent variable 0.446 0.349 0.795
Observations 689668 689668 689668
Panel B: Rural sample
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban -0.312∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0388) (0.0584)
Partial ban -0.280∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.0159
(0.0197) (0.0169) (0.0255)
Mean of dependent variable 0.535 0.372 0.907
Observations 420416 420416 420416
Panel C: Urban sample
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban -0.320∗ -0.207 -0.527
(0.161) (0.164) (0.314)
Partial ban -0.176∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.0703
(0.0449) (0.0645) (0.0887)
Mean of dependent variable 0.306 0.312 0.619
Observations 269252 269252 269252
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include
state FE, year FE and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors
clustered by state. Complete ban is dummy equal to 1 for observations
from states with complete alcohol prohibition during years when ban
is implemented. Similarly ‘Partial ban’ is a dummy for partial alcohol.
Household controls include age, sex, education level and marital status
of household head, number of male and female children under 18, house-
hold size, monthly per capita consumption quintile, religion, scheduled
caste or tribe.
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Table 4.4. Impact of prohibition policies on alcohol budget share (% of
total household consumption expenditure) among non-Muslim and Muslim
households
Panel A: Non-Muslim households
(1) (2) (3)
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban -0.304∗∗ -0.0571 -0.361∗
(0.123) (0.108) (0.187)
Partial ban -0.246∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.0498
(0.0649) (0.127) (0.138)
Mean of dependent variable 0.496 0.386 0.882
Observations 604953 604953 604953
Panel B: Muslim households
(1) (2) (3)
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban -0.0739 0.0235 0.0494
(0.0598) (0.0403) (0.0588)
Partial ban -0.0465 0.00351 -0.0342
(0.0512) (0.0489) (0.0683)
Mean of dependent variable 0.087 0.083 0.171
Observations 84753 84753 84753
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include
state FE, year FE and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors
clustered by state. Complete ban is dummy equal to 1 for observations
from states with complete alcohol prohibition during years when ban
is implemented. Similarly ‘Partial ban’ is a dummy for partial alcohol.
Household controls include age, sex, education level and marital status
of household head, number of male and female children under 18, house-
hold size, monthly per capita consumption quintile.
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Table 4.5. Impact of prohibition policies on alcohol budget share (% of
total household consumption expenditure) of households: triple-difference
estimates
Panel A: Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.112 -0.0672 -0.179
(0.113) (0.0897) (0.163)
Partial ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.110 0.195∗ 0.0855
(0.0691) (0.103) (0.0837)
Mean of dependent variable 0.446 0.349 0.795
Observations 689668 689668 689668
Panel B: Rural sample
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.167 0.125 -0.0423
(0.232) (0.199) (0.300)
Partial ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.149∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.151∗
(0.0640) (0.0548) (0.0826)
Mean of dependent variable 0.535 0.372 0.907
Observations 420416 420416 420416
Panel C: Urban sample
arrack Non-arrack alcohol Total alcohol
Complete ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.127 -0.241∗ -0.369
(0.161) (0.122) (0.271)
Partial ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.0522 0.116 0.0638
(0.0525) (0.0705) (0.0747)
Mean of dependent variable 0.306 0.312 0.619
Observations 269252 269252 269252
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state
FE, year FE and state-specific linear time trends and interaction of state
and year dummies with indicator for non-Muslim household. Standard
errors clustered by state. Complete ban is dummy equal to 1 for obser-
vations from states with complete alcohol prohibition during years when
ban is implemented. Similarly ‘Partial ban’ is a dummy for partial al-
cohol. Household controls include age, sex, education level and marital
status of household head, number of male and female children under 18,
household size, monthly per capita consumption quintile, religion, sched-
uled caste or tribe.
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Table 4.6. Impact of prohibition policies on tobacco budget share (% of
total household consumption expenditure) of households
Panel A: Difference-in-difference estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Complete ban -0.0824 -0.0830 -0.0628
(0.109) (0.133) (0.0959)
Partial ban 0.820∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.271) (0.275)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 1.111 1.192 0.983
Observations 689668 420416 269252
Panel B: Triple-difference estimates
Full sample Rural Urban
Complete ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 0.188 0.490∗∗ -0.173
(0.160) (0.231) (0.228)
Partial ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 0.127∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ -0.0344
(0.0453) (0.0636) (0.0652)
Mean of dependent variable 1.111 1.192 0.983
Observations 689668 420416 269252
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state
FE, year FE and state-specific linear time trends and interaction of state
and year dummies with indicator for non-Muslim household (for Panel
B). Standard errors clustered by state. Complete ban is dummy equal
to 1 for observations from states with complete alcohol prohibition dur-
ing years when ban is implemented. Similarly ‘Partial ban’ is a dummy
for partial alcohol. Household controls include age, sex, education level
and marital status of household head, number of male and female chil-
dren under 18, household size, monthly per capita consumption quintile,
religion, scheduled caste or tribe.
106
Table 4.7. Impact of prohibition policies on education budget share (% of
total household consumption expenditure) of households
Panel A: Difference-in-difference estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Rural Urban
Complete ban -0.355 -0.661∗∗∗ -0.101
(0.283) (0.223) (0.296)
Partial ban -0.446∗∗ -0.276∗ -0.634∗∗
(0.182) (0.157) (0.244)
Mean of dependent variable 2.433 1.838 3.362
Observations 689719 420419 269300
Panel B: Triple-difference estimates
Full sample Rural Urban
Complete ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.0973 -0.0284 0.139
(0.366) (0.396) (0.292)
Partial ban=1 × Non-Muslim=1 -0.321∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.306∗
(0.149) (0.177) (0.176)
Mean of dependent variable 2.433 1.838 3.362
Observations 689719 420419 269300
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state
FE, year FE and state-specific linear time trends and interaction of state
and year dummies with indicator for non-Muslim household (for Panel
B). Standard errors clustered by state. Complete ban is dummy equal
to 1 for observations from states with complete alcohol prohibition dur-
ing years when ban is implemented. Similarly ‘Partial ban’ is a dummy
for partial alcohol. Household controls include age, sex, education level
and marital status of household head, number of male and female chil-
dren under 18, household size, monthly per capita consumption quintile,
religion, scheduled caste or tribe.
107
Table 4.8. Impact of prohibition policies on years of schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls With Controls Urban only Rural only
Complete ban × 0.195 0.202∗ 0.121 0.287∗
age 6 - 18 (0.128) (0.0999) (0.105) (0.144)
Partial ban × -0.302∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
age 6 - 18 (0.0275) (0.0581) (0.0877) (0.0433)
Observations 227470 227470 109624 117846
Dep. variable mean 6.56 6.56 7.98 5.25
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state and year fixed
effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by state. Alcohol
policies enacted from 1974 to 1997 on completed years of schooling of individuals born
after 1960 and at least 18 years of age by 2005-06. Impact disaggregated by exposure to
complete or partial prohibition policies. Exposure defined as being in the school-going age
6 - 18 during ban
Table 4.9. Impact of prohibition on school drop-out: Dependent variable
=1 if dropped out from school before 12 years of schooling
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Urban Rural
Exposure to complete ban -0.0421 -0.0424 -0.0511∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0438) (0.0237)
Exposure to partial ban 0.0201∗ 0.0277∗∗ 0.00908
(0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0167)
Observations 227470 109624 117846
Mean of dependent variable 0.693 0.601 0.800
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state and year fixed
effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by state. Alcohol
policies enacted from 1974 to 1997 on completed years of schooling of individuals born
after 1960 and at least 18 years of age by 2005-06. Impact disaggregated by exposure to
complete or partial prohibition policies. Exposure defined as being in the school-going age
6 - 18 during ban
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Table 4.10. Falsification test the impact of prohibition policies on years of
schooling of cohorts who were aged 19-21 (greater than the school-going
age) at the time of the policies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls With Controls Urban only Rural only
Complete ban × 0.280 0.259∗ 0.175 0.346∗
age 6 - 18 (0.170) (0.130) (0.127) (0.175)
Partial ban × -0.306∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.166 -0.461∗∗∗
age 6 - 18 (0.0620) (0.0831) (0.123) (0.0856)
Complete ban × 0.177 0.120 0.108 0.125
age 19 - 21 (0.115) (0.0834) (0.100) (0.0899)
Partial ban × -0.0138 -0.0663 0.0850 -0.268
age 19 -21 (0.166) (0.130) (0.127) (0.194)
Observations 227470 227470 109624 117846
Note: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include state and year-of-birth
fixed effects, state-specific linear time trends and control variables used in Columns (2)
(4) are identical to those in Table 4.8. Standard errors clustered by state. Alcohol policies
enacted from 1974 to 1997 on completed years of schooling of individuals born after 1960
and at least 18 years of age by 2005-06.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 2
Figure 1: Location of air quality meters
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Figure 2: Locations of NFHS - IV sample clusters
120
Figure 3: Impact of up-wind fires on NO2 (µg per m
3): Plot of regression
coefficients
(a)
(b)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level. Estimates from the regression of NO2
on number of up-wind fires. Reference category is zero up-wind fires. Sample is monthly
air-quality meter data 2013-15 for 257 cities. All specifications include month FE,
quarter-by-year FE, city-by-year FE, number of fires in non up-wind
directions,temperature, precipitation and windspeed.
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Figure 4: Impact of up-wind fires on SO2 (µg per m
3): Plot of regression
coefficients
(a)
(b)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at city level. Estimates from the regression of SO2
on number of up-wind fires. Reference category is zero up-wind fires. Sample is monthly
air-quality meter data 2013-15 for 257 cities. All specifications include month FE,
quarter-by-year FE, city-by-year FE, number of fires in non up-wind
directions,temperature, precipitation and windspeed.
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Table 1: Fire activity within 75 km buffer
Up-wind fires Down-wind fires Total fires
Panel A: Fire activity around cities with pollution measures
mean sd mean sd mean sd
City-month 5.414 27.725 6.727 35.25 49.305 209.115
Observations 7449
Panel B: Fire activity - sample of births in NFHS 4
Up-wind fires Down-wind fires Total fires
Months before birth mean sd mean sd mean sd
0 5.157 23.329 4.838 21.253 40.091 133.611
1 5.003 22.891 4.708 20.749 38.817 129.697
2 4.853 22.428 4.545 20.122 37.718 126.687
3 4.789 22.126 4.452 19.711 37.263 124.777
4 4.707 21.863 4.381 19.197 36.681 122.94
5 4.66 21.729 4.311 19.034 36.011 122.001
6 4.618 21.388 4.276 19.07 35.771 121.951
7 4.592 21.491 4.309 19.187 35.757 122.101
8 4.751 22.495 4.3 19.094 36.13 123.122
9 4.901 22.51 4.463 19.854 37.456 125.971
10 5.054 23.159 4.802 21.317 39.44 132.15
Observations 407386
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Table 2. Impact of fires on SO2 ( µ g per m
3 )
(1) (2)
75 km 100 km
Up-wind fires:
1-4 0.0696 0.0789
(0.0758) (0.0862)
≥ 5 0.1023 0.1087
(0.1260) (0.1059)
Down-wind fires:
1-4 -0.0018 0.1719∗∗
(0.0838) (0.0829)
≥ 5 -0.0590 -0.0483
(0.1364) (0.1146)
Dep. var. mean 8.64 8.64
Observations 7150 7150
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of average monthly air quality
meter readings from 257 cities for 2013 - 2015. Standard errors clustered at city level (N
= 257). Control variables include temperature, precipitation, windspeed, and number of
fires in non up-wind or down-wind direction. All specifications include month FE, year
FE, and city-by-quarter FE.
Table 3. Impact of fires on NO2 ( µ g per m
3 )
(1) (2)
75 km 100 km
Up-wind fires:
1-4 0.0210 0.0561
(0.3844) (0.3633)
≥ 5 0.7981∗ 0.3109
(0.4811) (0.3517)
Down-wind fires:
1-4 -0.5608∗ -0.0889
(0.3041) (0.2375)
≥ 5 -0.4079 -0.3311
(0.4746) (0.3891)
Dep. var. mean 25.99 25.99
Observations 3689 3689
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of average monthly air quality
meter readings from 257 cities for 2013 - 2015. Standard errors clustered at city level (N
= 257). Control variables include temperature, precipitation, windspeed, and number of
fires in non up-wind or down-wind direction. All specifications include month FE, year
FE, and city-by-quarter FE.
124
Table 4. Impact of number of up-wind fires during 0-2 months
prior to birth on birth weight (in grams)
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
75 km 100 km 75 km 100 km
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 7.5423 5.9414 -24.0624 -20.0099
(9.9445) (10.5626) (20.0887) (19.9611)
≥ 5 17.8719 16.4944 -11.5616 -22.8248
(13.0445) (12.8223) (26.4540) (24.8040)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 5.1227 -0.6808 -22.2872 -37.1253∗
(10.1902) (10.4164) (20.6382) (20.2665)
≥ 5 -2.5406 -24.9811∗ -34.0113 -39.3823
(12.9325) (12.7980) (26.9735) (24.7716)
Dep. var. mean 2806.12 2806.12 2824.24 2824.24
Observations 43711 43711 13683 13683
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
February 2020 to August 2016. Dependent variables is birth weight measured in grams.
Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster level (N = 27997). Specification
includes controls for non up-wind fires, temperature, rainfall, windspeed and individual,
maternal and household characteristics. All specifications include month of birth FE, year
of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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Table 5. Impact of up and down-wind fires during 0-2 months
prior to birth on low birth-weight
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
75 km 100 km 75 km 100 km
Up-wind fires:
1− 4 -0.0023 -0.0058 0.0123 0.0114
(0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0128) (0.0125)
≥ 5 -0.0183∗∗ -0.0180∗∗ 0.0056 0.0141
(0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0165) (0.0156)
Down-wind fires:
1− 4 -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0257∗∗ 0.0214
(0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0127) (0.0131)
≥ 5 0.0039 0.0178∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0166) (0.0160)
Dep. var. mean 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
Observations 43711 43711 13683 13683
Notes: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample consists of all births recorded from
February 2020 to August 2016. Dependent variables takes value 1 if birth-weight was
less than 2500 grams. Standard errors are clustered at the NFHS sample cluster level
(N = 27997). Specification includes controls for non up-wind fires, temperature, rain-
fall, windspeed and individual, maternal and household characteristics. All specifications
include month of birth FE, year of birth FE, and cluster-by-quarter FE.
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